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Abstract
Environmental policies are designed to be governmental attempts to change social
behaviors that have negative environmental consequences; they are intended to protect natural
resources and the interests of U.S. citizens. However, the reality of policy enforcement rarely
reflects these goals. Research shows that enforcement is often unequal, more stringent in some
areas and weaker in others. The resulting environmental injustices are the manifestation of
political interference and organizational impediments in the policy process. Most environmental
policy analyses focus on the macro, federal-level of policy. In doing so, they neglect the final,
crucial step in which policy is made real – enforcement. This thesis addresses the gaps in
environmental policy research by studying the street-level bureaucrats who enforce the Clean
Water Act (CWA), exploring the experiences of individual local regulators who write permits,
run programs, and perform inspections. I engaged in ethnographic research to examine
compliance enforcement at state and local levels. The data came from interviews and
observations completed in the spring of 2011 with street-level environmental regulators in the
Division of Water Quality in the Knoxville Field Office of the Tennessee Department of
Environment and Conservation. Through this case study I draw connections among the
experiences of street-level regulators, the politics of environmental policy, the problematic
bureaucratic structure of public agencies, and the failures of environmental policies.
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Chapter One
Introduction
Environmental policies are supposed to be governmental attempts to change behaviors
that have negative environmental consequences; they are intended to protect natural resources
and the interests of U.S. citizens. However, the reality of policy enforcement rarely reflects these
goals. Research shows that enforcement is often unequal, more stringent in some areas and
weaker in others. The resulting environmental injustices are the manifestation of political
interference in the policy process. This interference occurs at every stage of the policy process,
but there is a lack of research on how this happens at the final stage of enforcement.
In order to examine how politics continue to manifest themselves in the policy process,
even into the enforcement stage, this thesis is an exploration of how the local, street-level
regulators charged with the enforcement of national environmental policies experience their job.
I analyze the micro-level experiences and perceptions of these individuals as embedded within
the larger political and bureaucratic structures of the policy process. As the final stage in the
process, they are affected by these structures, which then affect the enforcement decisions they
make.
Environmental policies designed to protect and preserve natural resources are inescapably
political. From the very beginning of the policy process to the final stage of revisions and
evaluation there is political interference by powerful stakeholders, sometimes directly and
sometimes indirectly. Powerful economic and political actors are able to participate in defining
environmental problems (Krogman 1996), deciding what problems are addressed in policies
(Kraft 2004), and determining the stringency of those policies (Bonds 2010). As a result, the
interests of the people, especially those politically and economically disadvantaged, are
marginalized.
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The interference of powerful stakeholders is often made possible in the policy process
through the bureaucratic structure of policy creation and implementation. Although modern
bureaucracies are heralded as the most egalitarian means of dispersing social services, protection,
and resources, in reality they support problematic power relations. From the top to the bottom of
a bureaucracy, the structure of the organization creates social relations internally and externally
that often stymie its overall success (Brown 1998, Heffron 1989). This is especially problematic
in public agencies, like the EPA and state environmental agencies designed to protect natural
resources and provide services to the people of the United States. The hierarchical, rigid
bureaucratic approach of the U.S. environmental policy process leaves little room for flexibility
and locally informed policy, ensuring policy that will continue to be inefficient and often unjust.
Environmental policy is supposed to offer solutions to the environmental problems and
injustices created by social processes. However, these solutions are consistently thwarted by
political, economic, and organizational impediments. As Daniel Fiorino (1995) asserts,
environmental protection must be more than science or numbers, as it is “a matter also of
politics, laws, and relations among institutions (99).” Policy analyses must pay considerable
attention to the political and structural impediments to creating and enforcing effective and
socially just environmental policies.
A body of literature within political science, sociology, and resource management has
emerged in an attempt to do so. However, most analyses focus on the macro, federal-level. These
are stages of the policy process that involve definitions of the problem and potential solutions,
legislative formulation of a resolution of the problem, and implementation of the resolution
through rules, standards, and programs. But these analyses neglect the final step in which policy
is made real – enforcement.
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Enforcement of environmental policies, through regular monitoring of physical sites and
other evaluative activities for compliance with designated rules and programs, is the actual final
stage of the policy process. The Environmental Council of the States (ECOS) estimates that
regulators in state agencies conduct 90 percent of all environmental policy enforcement actions
(ECOS Report to Congress 2001). Although local level environmental policy enforcement
activity is perhaps the most crucial step in the policy process it is seldom explored by policy
analysts.
My research project addresses the gaps in environmental policy research by studying the
street-level bureaucrats who enforce the Clean Water Act (CWA), exploring the experiences of
individual local regulators who write permits, run programs, and perform inspections. I engaged
in ethnographic research to examine compliance enforcement at state and local levels. The data
came from interviews and observations completed in the spring of 2011 with street-level
environmental regulators in the Division of Water Quality in the Knoxville Field Office of the
Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation.
This research is unique in its approach, as the sociology of environmental policy is an
emerging area of study. It offers a new perspective and substantial insights into the social,
political, and systemic problems associated with environmental policy enforcement. How do
local level regulators experience their jobs? What difficulties do they encounter? How do they
conceive of their role in the local community and in the larger environmental protection
structure? Pursuit of such questions allowed me to draw connections among the experiences of
street-level regulators, the politics of environmental policy, the problematic bureaucratic
structure of public agencies, and the failures of environmental policies.
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Although this research is a small case study, it examines a crucial component in the
struggle to solve many social and environmental problems: how the politics and structures of our
policy framework create social relations that prevent actual environmental protection within
local communities. Most grassroots environmental campaigns begin on local levels, such efforts
would benefit from a more nuanced understanding of how larger power and bureaucratic
structures hinder the development of coalitions between state regulators and environmentalists.
This research is also tremendously important because the tensions and divisions that arise on a
local level hinder the effective protection of local natural resources and the health of the
community.
The thesis that follows is organized to not only share the perspectives of the street-level
bureaucrats who work in the Knoxville Field Office, but also embed their experiences within the
larger social and political structures that they function within. In the second chapter I summarize
the existing literature on the political and organizational impediments to the creation and
implementation of effective environmental policy, presenting an analytical framework for my
case study. Chapter three provides information about my research process and methodology. In
the fourth chapter I construct the background for my case study, detailing the particulars of the
Clean Water Act: its structure, major programs, and the agencies involved, including the
Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation. The fifth chapter is an analysis of my
data, exploratory findings that examine how the experiences of street-level bureaucrats in east
Tennessee are affected by the politics and structure of U.S. the environmental policy process. In
the sixth and final chapter I offer my concluding remarks, summarizing my findings again,
connecting them with the larger picture of environmental politics and policies, and suggesting
directions for future research.
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Chapter Two
Environmental Policy:
Politics, Problems and Possibilities
In this chapter I examine the U.S. environmental policy process and survey the literature
on the political and organizational problems associated with it. Using this background, I
formulate an analytical framework for this case study.
Power and Politics in the Environmental Policy Process
In environmental as in other matters, it is the federal government’s responsibility to
protect the interests of the majority and to maintain fairness. Kraft (2004) views the purpose of
environmental policy as the regulation of activities that privilege short-term, typically economic,
interests over long-term environmental interests, which frequently conflict. Consequently, power
typically determines whose environmental interests and values are protected.
Power relations shape policy outcomes throughout the five stages of the federal
environmental policymaking process: problem definition, agenda setting, policy formulation,
implementation, and enforcement (Anderson 2000, Kraft 2004). This model illuminates why, as
Kraft (2004) writes, “policymaking in the U.S. political system is almost never an orderly or tidy
process, nor does it typically meet expectations for either democracy or ecological rationality
(74).” Politics play a significant role in throughout the environmental policy process, in many
cases hindering the policy’s overall effectiveness. Each stage in the environmental policy process
presents space for political interference, indicating larger structural problems in our
governmental processes.
The problem definition stage occurs in the public sphere prior to formal policymaking.
Problems are identified and defined through public discourse, media, social movements, and
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political rhetoric. Problems must first gain public attention, and be agreed upon as a problem,
before they are adopted to the agenda for policy consideration.
The problem definition stage is characterized by competition over public perceptions of a
problem. As Kraft (2004) notes, “the mere existence of detrimental environmental conditions and
dire warnings about the future provide no guarantee that governments will act (Kraft 2004: 65).”
Although problem definitions should be based on scientific assessments and information, politics
and power often shape the availability of information and the context for public discourse on the
problem.
The phenomenon of “problem-framing” describes the public’s susceptibility to
manipulation in perceptions of environmental problems. Krogman (1996) compares the framing
tools used by regulators, environmental groups, and the regulated community to shape public
perceptions of problems associated with wetland use in Louisiana. She finds that the industry’s
framing was especially effective in defining the problem as a property rights issue rather than an
environmental problem. This frame influenced public support for wetland regulation and,
ultimately the policy designed to regulate it (Krogman 1996).
The agenda setting stage is an extension of the problem definition process and the politics
involved are similar. Agenda setting also occurs on a federal level in the public sphere as
politicians determine which problems are most important or worthy to be placed on the
environmental policy agenda. However, Kraft and Vig (2006) argue that it is “usually through
the exercise of organized group pressure” that a problem gets on the government’s policy agenda
(8). This stage is highly political and competitive, lobbyists for special interest groups are often
involved in pressuring politicians to place certain issues at the forefront of the policy agenda
while strategically relegating another issue to the back.
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Agenda setting is a crucial space in which powerful actors can advance their interests. As
Kraft (2004) states, “even under the best of circumstances, the various actors in environmental
policymaking are rarely equal in their political resources or influence. The business community,
for example, has far more resources for lobbying legislators and administrative agencies than do
environmental groups (69).” Such resources available to business interests are able to sway the
agenda of environmental policy to act on creating certain types of policies while ignoring or not
acting on others.
An example of this was during the Bush administration, at the behest of powerful energy
companies and because of his own connections to the industry Bush directly impacted the
environmental policy agenda by proposing new energy and environmental legislation that
“balanced environmental protection against other goals such as promoting economic growth (Vig
2006: 111).” These business-friendly policies were placed atop the legislative agenda,
subjugating those that might have more sustainable or more protective of the interests of the
nation as a whole.
The policy formulation stage begins once a problem has been defined and reaches the
national agenda. This stage encompasses the process of determining how to solve the identified
problem and also occurs on a national level but is often hidden from the view of the public (Kraft
2004). This is a time-consuming stage because “a multiplicity of policy actors play a role in
policy formulation, from environmental and business groups to think tank policy analysts and
formal policymakers and their staffs in legislatures and executive offices (of the president,
governors, county executives, mayors and city managers) (Kraft 2004: 69).” The people who are
most affected by the formulation of policy, however, are typically not involved or even aware of
them until they have already been created.
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The knowledge and opinions of communities that directly experience the pollution and
environmental hazards that result from policy decisions are typically not included in the policy
formulation process. Instead, this process relies on expert scientific and technological advice in
formulating a feasible plan of action to address a problem. Reliance on scientific experts can be
problematic because, despite public perceptions of science as objective, politics and power shape
science in many ways (Forsyth 2003). For example, Eric Bonds (2010) argues that powerful
elites use a “knowledge-shaping process” to control the creation and promulgation of
information. Elites systematically mobilize their resources, through funding particular types of
science research or think tanks, to shape knowledge in ways that will advance their agendas
(Bonds 2010). He shows that the lobbying efforts of powerful stakeholders weakened policy
designed to regulate the chemical ammonium perchlorate: the final policy decision on the
acceptable level of ammonium perchlorate in soil was nearly 25 times higher than EPA’s studies
recommended (Bonds 2010).
Once a policy is formulated, drafted, and passed by the legislative branch it is forwarded
to various government agencies for implementation. Again, this happens largely on the national
level. During this stage, legislative intentions are operationalized through programs developed by
federal regulatory agencies, like the Environmental Protection Agency. The creation of programs
includes “the interpretation of statutory language, organization of bureaucratic offices and
efforts, provision of sufficient resources (e.g. money, staff, and expertise), and the details of
administration such as provision of benefits, enforcement of environmental regulations, and
monitoring of compliance (Kraft 2004: 72).” The rules are then posted in the Federal Register for
review. This again is a very political process in which federal agencies compete for resources.
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Although they are supposed to determine the most effective regulation programs, they again are
often pressured by lobbyists and informed by problematic science.
After an implementation program has been determined for an environmental policy those
programs are typically promulgated to state environmental agencies for enforcement (Welborn
1988). This is the only stage of the policy process that occurs on a local level. Enforcement
consists of environmental and facility inspections, permit writing, and punitive actions for
violations. It is in this hands-on stage that policy is made real, with decisions by local level
enforcers that carry out the intentions of policymakers. Although this is, perhaps, the most
crucial stage of the policy process there is not a significant amount of research analyzing how
power relations influence it. In most policy analyses the enforcement stage is conceptualized as
static or instrumental. Local regulators are assumed to make enforcement decisions following the
strict bureaucratic processes laid out in the policy and their respective programs. However, this is
rarely the case.
The environmental policy process is entrenched in politics. From the very beginning of
problem definition to the final evaluation stage, the interests of powerful stakeholders permeate,
often impairing, the creation and implementation of environmental policies. Compounding the
problems that power and politics produce in the policy process are organizational and
bureaucratic impediments. The complexity, rigidity, and haphazard nature of the U.S. policy
framework exacerbates the already problematic forces of political interests in the environmental
policy process.
Organization and Bureaucratic Impediments to Environmental Policy
Organizational and bureaucratic impediments abound within U.S. environmental policy.
In particular, the federalist model utilized in the national policy framework is inefficient and
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disorganized. Under a federalist policy model the EPA translates federal policies into
enforceable programs, which are then promulgated to the states for enforcement. State agencies
are then considered to have primacy for that program.
Each state agency is organized differently for bureaucratic, political, and historical
reasons. Some states are more stringent in their implementation, for political and budgetary
reasons. Additionally, some may have primacy on some programs but not on others. Under the
CWA, for example, 46 of the states have primacy in implementing the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). In Idaho, New Mexico, Maine, and New Hampshire,
however, the EPA maintains control over the program (Environmental Council of the States
2011).
Lieber and Rosinoff’s (1975) research into the nature of water protection under the Clean
Water Act (CWA) is an early example of scholarly critiques of federalism. They analyze state
environmental programs in New York, Mississippi, Texas, Washington and Wyoming both
before and after the 1972 implementation of the CWA. The authors find that some states were
forced to shuffle and change already-effective programs; others spent money on equipment and
programs not necessary in their state. Lieber and Rosonoff (1975) conclude that it is difficult and
ineffective to implement one national policy in all states.
Other research demonstrates that the facilities regulated through enforcement activities
are diverse and respond differentially to regulatory activity, rendering implementation of broadbrush national programs highly problematic. For example, Earnhart (2009) found that the size
and operation type of a regulated facility and its pre-existing permit conditions affect the success
of regulatory actions taken against it. Glicksman and Earnhart (2008) found that a variety of
facility characteristics, such as public ownership, stringency of the limits imposed, and the
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volatility of the company affect its response to threats of inspection, actual inspections and the
threat of civil sanctions. Gray and Shadbegian (2007) found that facilities whose pollution affects
areas with more children and elderly emit less pollution than those in other areas, indicating the
influence of local demographic factors on compliance with environmental mandates.
The bureaucratic agency model itself is unrealistic and problematic for environmental
policy enforcement. Hunter and Waterman (1996) use a survey of EPA personnel and a data
analysis of enforcement actions across ten EPA regions and 50 states to illustrate the complexity
of enforcement activities and the methods personnel use to deal with it. They argue that those
who enforce environmental policy perform a difficult job because of the wide variety of issues
with which they are confronted. Although EPA’s goal is to promote strict, by-the-book
enforcement, the reality is that enforcement by most personnel is characterized by compromise,
flexibility and selective enforcement to cope with the pressure of their job (Hunter and
Waterman 1996).
Mintz (1995) used interviews and personal experiences working in the EPA to
demonstrate the complexity of environmental policy enforcement. He argues that the actual
enforcement of environmental policies inevitably occurs on a case-by-case basis because of the
fluid and dynamic nature of environmental regulation and environmental problems. He notes that
“any attempt at standardized decision making by the EPA is confounded by the enormous variety
of conditions and circumstances that individual cases involve (Mintz 1995, 16).” For example, he
notes that when choosing which enforcement action to take,
officials typically consider, among other things, the degree to which the
source’s discharge or emission exceeds applicable legal requirements, the
duration of the violation, the number of previous enforcement actions that
have been taken successfully against the same source, any relevant
national EPA enforcement policies, the potential deterrence value of the
case, the resources available to the agency and DOJ at the time of the
decision (Mintz 1995: 12).
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Much like the situation Hunter and Waterman (1996) describe, this enforcement process is
flexible and selective. This reality stands in contrast to the standardization emphasized by most
environmental legislation.
Other scholars argue that the complexity and bureaucracy of the federalist model creates
conflicts and organizational overlap that hinder effective enforcement of environmental policies.
Crane’s (1994) case study on water protection permits in New York examined enforcement
conflicts over whether a state agency or a federal agency should enforce state defined water
quality standards that were included in a federal permit. Crane (1994) argues that federal permits
should be enforced by the federal agency that wrote them, even if the standards were decided by
the state.
In a similar case, Adler (2010) describes a mining operation seeking a permit to release
mining waste and tailings into a clean Alaskan lake. The vague language of the relevant policies
suggested that it could be covered under two different types of permits. One permit would
disallow their activities and would be written and enforced by the EPA and state government.
The other permit would allow their activity if it included a plan for mitigation that was written
and enforced by the Army Corps of Engineers. The operation applied for and received the latter
permit, which allowed them to pollute directly into the lake with a promise of mitigation after the
operation was complete (Adler 2010).

This is another example of how overlaps in the

enforcement process threaten the success and stringency of policy.
As a result of the decentralization of enforcement under the federalist model, conflicts
have arisen over who has the right to regulate shared resources. This is especially apparent in the
literature on water policy. Fort (1995) examines a conflict in New Mexico between the city of
Albuquerque and the Isleta Pueblo tribe over water quality standards for the Rio Grande to
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examine jurisdictional problems under the CWA. Under the CWA the city must include the
tribe’s water quality standards if the EPA approves them. In this case, the city sued the EPA for
approving the Pueblo’s water quality standards that they felt were unattainable and unreasonable.
Fort’s (1995) analysis of the Rio Grande case and the data on interstate pollution demonstrate the
jurisdictional complexity of the problems of environmental policy enforcement in the United
States.
Each state or tribe is allowed to determine their own pollution standards, as long as they
are equally or more stringent than national standards. However, natural resources and pollution
do not adhere to political boundaries. These cases have proven very difficult to solve and can be
problematic especially when one state is benefiting economically from applying less stringent
regulation to a polluting facility in its jurisdiction, but another state is polluted by its runoff with
no economic benefits. An example is the Pigeon River that is polluted by a paper mill in North
Carolina then runs through the mountains into an impoverished area of eastern Tennessee
(Bartlett 1995). Situations such as these lead to scholars and researchers critiquing the
decentralized federalist system used for enforcing environmental policies, it creates conflicts that
lead to inconsistent, and often unjust, enforcement.
Although proponents of federalism posit that states should enforce policy because they
would be more protective, research indicates that state agencies are less stringent in enforcement
activities than their federal counterparts. Atlas (2007) analyzes hazardous waste law violation
penalties by state governments and EPA regional offices in 32 states over 14 years. He finds
statistically significant differences in penalties between state and EPA enforcement actions, 21 of
the states were shown to hand out considerably lower penalties than their EPA counterparts.
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Similarly, Hornyak and Halvorsen (2003) demonstrate that the promulgation of
permitting authority to the states does not ensure better enforcement. They analyze the case of
Michigan, one of a very few states to assume 404 permitting authority under the CWA. Hornyak
and Halvorsen (2003) find high rates of noncompliance in regulated operations in Michigan,
similar to areas where the process is regulated by the federal Army Corps of Engineers. They
argue that state assumption of regulation does not mean greater wetland protection.
Another issue that stems from the decentralization of enforcement activity is a “race to
the bottom” among the state environmental agencies, a competition to have the weakest possible
regulation in order to entice economic development. Konisky (2009) examines state-level
enforcement data on environmental legislation from 1985 to 2000 to determine if a state’s
environmental regulation is influenced by the regulatory behavior of other states. He finds
evidence of an interaction between regulatory behavior in different states: states respond to a 10
percent decrease in other states’ enforcement with a five to 15 percent decrease in their own
efforts.
Beyond economic competition, there are also fundamental political and resource
differences among the states that lead to inconsistent enforcement. Fiorino (1995) argues that
“states vary in their commitment to environmental goals and the quality of their programs.”
Some states “are known to have strong environmental programs that are run by capable and
effective agencies… agencies in other states suffer from limited political support, inadequate
funding, or poor institutional capacities (87).”
Flatt (1997), for example, empirically analyzes the enforcement activities of Georgia and
Washington and finds inconsistent stringency in their actions and speed of action. He found that
there were more non-compliant sources reported in Washington but the length of non-
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compliance was significantly higher in Georgia. He argues that this suggests that Georgia was far
less active in inspecting, reporting and responding to non-compliant facilities or sources.
Similarly, Keller and Cavallero (2008) review the processes of each state for 303(d) listing
waterways under the federal CWA. The study found that criteria, techniques, and quality of data
vary widely across states. This, they argue, hinders the attainment of national water quality
standards and prevents the accumulation of data regarding national water quality.
Another problem stemming from the decentralized enforcement model is the
externalization of environmental hazards from one state to other nearby states. Helland and
Whitford (2003) use data from the EPA’s Toxic Releases Inventory (TRI) to compare permitting
data among facilities in border and non-border regions. They find that border counties have
significantly higher air and water emissions (Helland and Whitford 2003). Sigman (2005) uses
water quality statistics from 500 river monitoring stations around the United States and
determines that water quality is four percent lower at stations downstream from a primacy state
than at other stations, indicating substantial hazardous runoff. These findings indicate not only
problems with water projection, but also environmental injustices in which one state benefits
economically but another state must deal with the consequences.
Environmental injustice research focuses on how environmental hazards often
disproportionately affect certain communities more than others. One of the major causes of
environmental injustice in the United States in an unequal enforcement of environmental policy
due to local economic, social and political factors. Scholars have argued that the decentralized
nature of environmental policy enforcement promotes this behavior because state and local
regulators are more likely to be influenced by local political or economic considerations (Adler
2010).
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For example, Konisky and Schario (2010) compare the enforcement of CWA policies
with the racial and economic composition of populations surrounding facilities. The outcome
shows legitimate disparities in the amount of sanctions imposed on facilities and inspections of
facilities in poor communities between 2000 and 2005. Similarly, Helland (1998) demonstrates
that the closer a facility is to economic failure the less likely it is to be inspected by local
regulation agencies. Conversely, the wealthier the surrounding community is the more likely a
facility is to be inspected.
Konisky (2009) uses a count model to track Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and RCRA
enforcement at a county level for facilities and compare it to local demographics. He argues that
states perform less enforcement in poor counties, ranging from a two to five percent decrease in
enforcement per each percent increase in poverty. Lynch and Stretesky (2004) statistically
compare a sample of 206 monetary penalties handed out to refineries between 2001 and 2003
with the characteristics of their communities. The authors find that refineries situated within the
boundaries of Hispanic and low-income ZIP codes tend receive smaller penalties than refineries
located in non-Hispanic and more affluent ZIP codes.
Analytical Plan for Study
The inadequacies of U.S. environmental policy are undoubtedly political in nature, and
the influence of politics and power is abetted by several organizational and bureaucratic
problems as well. The complexity of policy implementation and enforcement leads to gaps and
overlaps in agency responsibility. The bureaucratic model is unrealistic for the actualization of
environmental policy. The federalist framework for enforcement creates jurisdictional conflicts
and promotes unequal enforcement. It is in this context that I frame my case study, examining
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these impediments to enforcement from the ground up through the experiences of local, streetlevel environmental regulators.
My review of the research on factors contributing to the inefficiency of environmental
policy reveals two substantial gaps that I address in this thesis. First, the research is almost
entirely quantitative. Quantitative studies provide strong indicators of inadequate environmental
policies and persistent pollution yet shed little light on the reasons for these problems. The scant
qualitative research focuses on the experiences of EPA personnel (Mintz 1995, Hunt and
Waterman 1994). Second, few studies examine policy enforcement at state and local levels.
These deficits, in qualitative approaches and the nearly exclusive focus on policymaking
stages at the federal level, are problematic. Research demonstrates that adequate policy
enforcement deters high pollution levels (Gray and Shimshack 2011, Magat and Viscusi 1990).
The actual enforcement activities of monitoring and inspecting facilities are carried out locally,
at the facility’s physical site. Yet, they are rarely included in policy analysis.
This case study contributes to the literature by addressing those gaps, focusing on the
attitudes and experiences of the street-level enforcers of the Clean Water Act in East Tennessee.
I interviewed and shadowed enforcers in their regulatory activities to explore the following
research questions. How do state and local enforcers’ perceptions of their jobs influence their
enforcement activities? How do state and local enforcers coordinate their enforcement efforts?
What organizational features constrain state and local enforcers’ actions?
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Chapter Three
Research Design and Methodology
Research on the inadequacies of environmental policy is marred by two significant gaps:
an overabundance of quantitative research designs and an overwhelming focus on the early,
federal stages of the policymaking process – despite substantial research documenting the critical
nature of street-level enforcement activities. This research aims to begin closing those gaps
through an exploratory study of the perceptions and experiences of local water quality regulators,
street-level enforcers of the Clean Water Act, at the Knoxville field office of the Tennessee
Department of Environment and Conservation.
Research Design
Fetterman (2010) defines a research design as “an idealized blueprint or road map that
helps… conceptualize how each step will follow the one before to build knowledge and
understanding” (8). The research design I adopted for this study is, overall, an ethnographic
approach in the form of a contextualized case study focused on in-depth interviews and
observation.
The aim of ethnographic research is to “offer a glimpse of another person’s perceptual
world (Burnard 1991: 464).” This goal requires a particular research approach. This includes
maintaining a nonjudgmental orientation, an effort to withhold personal judgments and beliefs,
and an emic or phenomenological approach, accepting and recognizing the validity of insiders’
perceptions of reality (Fetterman 2010). This approach differs from other methods in which
researchers are separated from their research subjects. Gold (1997) argues that “rather than
relying on a preconceived framework for gathering and analyzing data, ethnographers use their
interactions with informants to discover and create analytical frameworks for understanding and
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portraying that which is under study (399).” The goal for this case study is to explore the
“perceptual world” of TDEC employees through interviews and observations.
A case study is a research method that focuses on a specific phenomenon, using multiple
data sources to examine potentially influential contextual variables. Yin explains that case
studies “allow an investigation to retain the holistic meaningful characteristics of real-life
events” (1994: 3). For Yin, the method is an empirical inquiry that “investigates contemporary
phenomenon within its real-life context” and “copes with the technically distinctive situation in
which there will be many more variables of interest than data points” (1994: 13). In this case, I
examine the experiences and perceptions of local environmental regulators using interviews and
observation.
The majority of the data for this case study comes from 15 semi-structured in-depth
interviews. Semi-structured interviews “are generally organized around a set of predetermined
open-ended questions, with other questions emerging from the dialogue between interviewer and
interviewee (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006: 315).” I created a set of open-ended questions
to guide my interviews, while also allowing them to evolve organically depending on the
direction each conversation took. This type of interviewing allows “researchers to co-create
meaning with interviewees by reconstructing perceptions of events and experiences (DiCiccoBloom and Crabtree 2006: 316).” I supplemented these interviews with one full day of
observation with one of the interviewees.
Field observation is another key component of ethnographic research. This type of
research is characterized by prolonged interaction with those being studied and firsthand
involvement in their activities (Levine et al 1980). This is crucial in any ethnographic work. In
fulfilling the task of their research, ethnographers must carry out “systematic, intensive, detailed
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observation of that behavior… and the social rules, interactional expectations, and cultural values
underlying behavior” (Watson-Gegeo 1988: 577). The data collected are narrative descriptions or
field notes that come from “direct observation, informal conversational interviews, and personal
experience” (Levine et al 1980: 38).
Yin advises that case studies are especially useful in situations where “a ‘how’ or ‘why’
question is being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little
or no control” (Yin 1994: 3). How do state and local enforcers’ perceptions of their jobs
influence their enforcement activities? How do state and local enforcers coordinate their
enforcement efforts? What organizational features constrain state and local enforcers’ actions?
Employing a case study methodology offers insight into a wide range of factors that might affect
environmental policy enforcement on a local level.
Data Collection
Research for this case study began in the spring of 2011 for a graduate field research
methods course at the University of Tennessee. All interviews and observations took place
between March and April. I gained entry to individuals working in the Division of Water
Quality at the Knoxville Field Office through several university-associated gatekeepers,
individuals who may be leaders within the group and whose discretion often determines the level
of access granted to a researcher. After initial email communication with gatekeepers, I arranged
a meeting to explain my intentions and the research process.
I drew upon prior research for initial interview questions, informed by my meeting with
gatekeepers who volunteered potential areas for research. In this way, my questions were
informed by both scholarly work and salient issues for the group. I constructed a semi-structured
interview guide (see appendix) and sent it to the gatekeepers who suggested a few modifications,
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which I incorporated. After the interview guide was approved by state and local TDEC levels, I
sent it to participants prior to the interviews.
The gatekeepers were central to the selection of participants. One gatekeeper sent a
department-wide email, requesting volunteers to be interviewed. The names and contact
information of those who expressed interest were forwarded to me. I contacted each individual to
arrange a time and place for the interview.
I interviewed 15 individuals and observed one interviewee during a day of work. Three
interviewees were women, 11 were males. All were white with at least bachelor’s degrees, some
with graduate degrees. Age ranged from late 20s to early 60s. Some had worked in the field
office for over 20 years, while others were relatively new employees.
Interview times and spaces were set at the participants’ convenience. All interviews
occurred at the Knoxville Field Office during work hours, in private offices, conference rooms,
or research spaces. Interview duration ranged between 20 minutes and two hours. Interviews
were recorded using computer video recording and handwritten notes. They were transcribed
individually using computer software to slow the audio recordings.
Privacy issues involving private entities, corporations and individuals, prevented me from
greater engagement in observation, I was only able to trail one regulator for a single day. The
person I shadowed was one of the gatekeepers and already familiar with my research intentions. I
accompanied him to two sites in a rural area outside of Knoxville city limits. I took notes and
asked questions on-site and during our downtime.
Data Analysis
As I conducted interviews, I kept notes, memos, and asides to track emergent themes. I
transcribed all interviews and field notes. I first coded the data for themes and patterns in May
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2011 and recoded and re-analyzed the data in February 2012. My rigorous and repetitive
analysis helped me avoid imposing exogenous meaning on the data. Although some researcher
bias is inevitable in wording the questions, choosing the methods, and performing analysis, it is
crucial to minimize this influence as much as possible.
I began with open coding, in which “categories are freely generated (Burnard 1991:
462).” I maintained a spreadsheet as I read through the data, creating category headings for the
main theme in each line. I paid close attention to “how members themselves characterize and
describe particular activities, events, and groups (Emerson et al 1995: 114).” I then collapsed the
category headings into broader themes, using pattern matching. I returned to the data once again
for a more focused coding during which I re-coded the lines according to those broader
categorical themes (Emerson et al 1995).
Using those themes, triangulated and framed with documents from TDEC, ECOS, EPA
and other organizations, I constructed the case study that follows, examining the experiences,
perceptions, and activities of employees at the TDEC Knoxville Field Office.
The next chapter will provide background to the case study. Examining the particulars of
the CWA and the agencies involved in enforcement offers context for the operating of TDEC
and the regulators I interviewed and observed. It will also highlight the history and organization
of TDEC itself, positioning the individuals in my case study within the larger picture of CWA
enforcement in Tennessee and the United States.

	
  

22	
  

Chapter Four
The Clean Water Act:
Bureaucracy, Structure, and Implementation
Public policies, like the Clean Water Act (CWA), are created and implemented through
an intricate network of bureaucratic programs and agencies. Weber (2005) considered the
bureaucratic agency to be a unique feature of advanced modern societies. According to him,
bureaucracies represent objective and legitimate authority. As modern societies become more
complex, Weber (2005) argued that there would be a need for a fair, rational source of public
decision-making. In the United States today public agencies as well as private organizations
utilize a bureaucratic structure. However, the ideal bureaucracy that Weber (2005) celebrated is
very different from the reality of the modern bureaucracy. The structure and functions of
bureaucracies have important implications for their overall success. In the case of public
agencies, like those charged with the enforcement of the CWA, this means their very structure
threatens their ability to effectively protect water quality. This chapter provides background for
this case study: a discussion about bureaucratic structure, the history and major programs of the
CWA, and the history and organization of the Tennessee Department of Environment and
Conservation.

Bureaucracy
Weber (2005) explained bureaucracy as characterized by official jurisdictional areas,
office hierarchy and the management of offices based on written documents. The bureaucratic
method attempted to standardize decision-making. Therefore it was viewed as an equalizer, the
epitome of rational action. The focus on rules and hierarchical supervision created a process that
Weber (2005) argued could separate the official activities of an individual within the
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organization from their private life and private beliefs. For this reason, Weber (2005) considered
the ideal model of bureaucracy to be the ultimate form of administration.
Although public bureaucracies provide a framework for formalizing and standardizing
the dispersal of government services to the people, there are many problems with how these
processes happen. Merton (1940) argued that goal displacement often occurs within
bureaucracies when individuals within an organization internalize the rigidity of the bureaucratic
processes, because of the strict emphasis on following rules and procedures. Merton (1940) also
argued that bureaucratic rigidity causes relationships within the bureaucracy and with outsiders
to become depersonalized. This depersonalization combined with the dogmatic adherence to the
rules of the organization causes conflicts with the public or with clients of the organization.
These unintended consequences of bureaucracy hinder its ability to successfully achieve its
goals, whether that be making money or providing a public service, like water protection.
Bureaucratic structure also fosters a certain type of social relations and culture within an
organization. Bureaucratic organizational culture develops gradually through shared experiences
and is transferred to new individuals through socialization (Brown 1998). The culture then
provides a common means of functioning, surviving, relating to each other within the
organization and relating to outsiders. Brown (1998) argues that individuals working in complex
organizations face “considerable uncertainty and complexity” but, “the adoption of the cultural
mind frame is an anxiety reducing device which simplifies the world, makes choices easier and
rational action seem possible (90).” The culture that develops within an organization has direct
implications for the success of the bureaucratic organization, as it defines how the employees see
their work, their clients, and the organization they work for.
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Similar to the cultural approach, organizational politics scholars emphasize how the
interpersonal experiences of individuals within the constraints and structure of a bureaucratic
organization affect its level of success. Heffron (1989) argues that “conflict appears to be
endemic in organizations composed of individuals and groups with diverse and conflicting
interests: professionals versus administrators, lower versus higher levels, clients versus
bureaucrats, civil servants versus political executives, line versus staff (183).” This indicates that
political problems stem directly from the structure of organizations.
Conflict arises for multiple reasons within organizations. Heffron (1989) argues that the
hierarchical nature of organizations is especially problematic, fostering tenuous power
relationships. Moreover, the structural differentiation built into organizations creates categories
of individuals who have different specialties, perspectives, and goals that are often in
competition with one another for resources or positions.
The next sections outline the history, major programs, and agencies involved in the
enforcement of the CWA. Drawing from the macro-level theories above, this case study is an
examination of how the street-level personnel in the bureaucratic enforcement of the CWA
experience their work within this framework. Further, it is an exploration of how those
experiences affect the quality of their work and the quality of CWA enforcement.

The Clean Water Act
Like all national policies, the Clean Water Act was formulated by the US Congress. It
first appeared in the form of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972. Although there
had been national water protection laws since 1948, this was the first legislation defining
national guidelines for water quality (Adler, Landman and Cameron 1993, Fiorino 1995). It
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“established a strong federal presence, set ambitious national goals, forced the development of
new technologies, and committed the nation to aggressive standard setting and enforcement
(Fiorino 1995, 24).”
The CWA was created during a time when the United States was beginning to experience
the environmental consequences of earlier decades of industrialization. Perhaps the most
infamous water quality cases was the Cuayahoga River in Ohio that caught on fire multiple times
due to its extensive chemical and biological pollution. At that time the Detroit River also
contained six times the limit of mercury set by the Public Health Service, the Hudson River was
found to have 170 times the safe limit of bacteria, and out of 590 fish samples taken across the
United States 584 samples were found to contain the toxic pesticide DDT, some being up to nine
times the FDA limit. (Andreen 2004). Also, 80 percent of that water pollution came from
industrial sources, known as direct or point-source dischargers (Andreen 2004).
Consequently the structure of the CWA was designed for application primarily to pointsource industrial and municipal dischargers of pollution. In particular, it mandates the use of
uniform, technology-based regulatory tools informed by state and national water quality
standards (Andreen 2004). The primary aim of the CWA is to directly address sources of
pollution, especially the industrial and municipal sources. It is structured to address these aims
through permitting systems designed to control alterations or pollution that affect American
waterways. These permits are standardized through the creation of water quality criteria,
developed on the federal and state level, intended to provide a minimum standard of water
quality across the nation.
Congress created the policy and is responsible for overseeing its progress, making
changes when necessary. The implementation of the policy, though, is left up to national and
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state agencies. Legislation is typically written in broad, general terms and so those agencies must
specify how to actually enforce it (Mintz 1995). The actualization of environmental policy
involves extensive scientific expertise that politicians do not often have. This process, “translates
federal environmental laws into specific and detailed statements defining how the laws will be
interpreted and applied to control specific pollutants or polluting activities (Rosenbaum 2006:
175).”
The primary federal agency tasked with actualizing the CWA is the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). The Nixon administration created the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) in December of 1970. It provided an umbrella agency for environmental duties
that had been shared by a variety of other government agencies and offices (Kraft and Vig 2006).
Programs from the Department of Health, Department of Interior, Department of Agriculture,
Food and Drug Administration, Atomic Energy Commission and other agencies were “patched
together” within the EPA (Fiorino 1995: 37). As a result the agency lacked internal consistency
from its very inception, contributing to its often confusing and contradictory activities, including
those under the CWA.
During the 1970s a slew of environmental legislation was instituted, including the CWA.
The EPA became the central authority on implementation and enforcement. Throughout that
decade the EPA experienced institutional and financial growth. However, after the initial boom
in environmental regulation, the EPA struggled with “personnel and budgetary shortages;
scientific and technical uncertainties; and the need for extensive consultation with other federal
agencies, Congress, and state governments (Kraft and Vig 2006: 18).” All of these shortcomings
made the Agency especially vulnerable to the deregulation efforts of the Reagan administration.
Rather than reform the EPA, the government drastically cut its budget and weakened its
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authority (Kraft and Vig 2006). These deregulation measures were never fully compensated for
in the subsequent administrations and the EPA still faces constant threat of budget cuts, despite
continually rising responsibilities and expectations.
Despite these cuts, the EPA is the federal government’s largest regulatory agency in
terms of budget and workforce. It is responsible for the implementation of thirteen environmental
statutes and partially responsible for dozens more which provides a “staggering range” of duties
for one agency (Rosenbaum 2006). According to the National Academy of Public
Administration, “the EPA lacks focus, in part, because Congress has passed more than a dozen
environmental statutes that drive the agency in a dozen directions, discouraging rational prioritysetting or a coherent approach to environmental management (as quoted in Rosenbaum 2006:
173).” They argued this in the mid-1990s and we have seen little change in this trend since, in
fact things may have become more complex and strained.
To deal with this range of duties the EPA is structured according to substantive,
functional and geographic principles (Fiorino 1995). Underneath the EPA Administrator and
Deputy Administrator there is an Administrator for the major substantive programs (air, water,
solid waste etc.) as well as for the functional necessities of the Agency, such as international
affairs, research and development, enforcement and compliance, resources management and
environmental information. Geographically, the EPA is split into ten regional offices with duties
in different areas of the United States (Rosenbaum 2006, Fiorino 1995). In those regional offices
duties are divided amongst senior career civil servants who head divisions with regulatory
responsibilities for each of the major programs.
Under the CWA the EPA has multiple supervisory, research, and enforcement
responsibilities that must be spread among administrators and regional offices. One of the most
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important is the creation of national effluent guidelines to standardize pollution levels from
various industries. These standards then guide the permitting process that enforces the CWA.
Establishing consistent water quality across the nation is difficult as each water body has
differing ecological and hydrological characteristics. Therefore, under the CWA, the EPA creates
effluent guidelines based not on the receiving water, but the water produced by pollution sources
based on the type of industry and the technology available within that sector. These effluent
guidelines are then handed down to those officials who write and enforce permits across the
country. They are industry specific, and are supposed to shift as new, cleaner technologies are
available within any given industry. In order to standardize the regulation of industrial pollution,
these guidelines were “designed to force industry to adopt the latest available technology
(Fiorino 1995: 28-29).”
Effluent guidelines are defined by the EPA and based on best available technology limits
(BAT). Andreen (2004) explains effluent guidelines and BAT limitations as
Generally based upon the application of specific kinds of control
technology for particular waste streams: best conventional treatment for
conventional pollutants such as organic waste; best available technology
for many toxics as well as non-toxics, non-conventional pollutants like
ammonia; and best available demonstrated technology for new facilities
(548).

Effluent guidelines are dependent on the technical capabilities of an industry as well as the
capacity for pollution prevention treatments to mitigate pollutants particular to that industry.
Andreen (2004) also makes note of the economic feasibility qualification applied to the
determination of BAT under the CWA. The BAT is only accepted as the best available if the
discharger can reasonably afford to implement the technology without facing severe economic
consequences.
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The creation and use of industry specific guidelines is beneficial in the creation of
national standards, but the application of broad, nationally defined criteria as the only means of
defining pollution limits is problematic. It is the responsibility of the EPA to create these
guidelines, but it is difficult to keep up with the evolution of industries, technology, and the
economy. BAT and effluent guidelines are out of date or do not even exist for many industrial
categories (Adler, Landman and Cameron 1993). Despite their limitations, these effluent
guidelines are the cornerstone of the CWA’s permitting process, which the EPA oversees.
The primary permitting tool used by the EPA and state agencies is the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System, or NPDES. The NPDES permitting process is meant to enforce
the national and state water quality standards and “serves as a device for transforming general
regulatory requirements into enforceable obligations of the individual dischargers (Andreen
2004: 549).” They are designed to be issued by state agencies, and the EPA where states that
have not been authorized, and must contain precise numerical limits that “move us relentlessly
toward the goal of zero discharge (Adler, Landman and Cameron 1993: 138.)” Every entity that
discharges pollution into the waters of the United States must be granted an NPDES permit
under the CWA. The EPA’s role is most often supervisory, but in some states where the
environmental agencies have not been delegated this program the EPA regional office does the
permitting.
Section 402 of the CWA outlines the NPDES system that controls the direct discharge of
pollution. Similarly, section 404 authorizes another permitting process, regulated by the federal
Army Corps of Engineers. This program issues permits for the discharge of dredged and fill
materials specifically (Fiorino 1995). The 404 permitting process regulates any construction
processes that would result in the dumping of dredge or fill materials into bodies of water, most
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often a lake or wetland and are often called Aquatic Resource Alteration Permits or ARAPs.
Although section 404 was originally included into the CWA to preserve navigable waterways in
the United States, it has evolved into a tool to protect wetlands (Murchison 2005). Guidelines for
this permitting process are established by the EPA and the permits themselves are subject the
Agency’s reviews. However, the EPA rarely uses its veto power over the Corps in 404
permitting (Fiorino 1995).
The United States Army Corps of Engineers was created in 1802 for the express purpose
of “making and keeping inland waterways navigable (Lowry 2006: 313).” Initially this included
engineering projects such as dam construction and levee creation. Since this time the Corps’
duties have expanded to include flood control, hydroelectric power generation and with the
advent of the CWA, environmental protection (Lowry 2006).
Within the CWA the Corps is responsible for the section 404 permitting process. Section
404 of the CWA allows for the discharge of dredged or fill materials into waterways only with
an official permit from the Corps (Murchison 2005). This is a duty of the Corps’ because of their
responsibility to maintain the navigability of United States waterways. It is important to note that
the primary goal of this process is to maintain navigability, not necessarily the ecological
integrity of the waterway itself. In section 402 of the CWA the Corps is also given responsibility
to veto any other water permits if they threaten the navigability of that waterway (Murchison
2005). The veto power of both the EPA and the Corps under the CWA creates significant
overlap and conflict within the structure of the CWA.
The Corps’ permitting process, although similar to NPDES permitting, has some
important differences. The 404 permit does not use technology-based standards to determine
legality of discharge, rather the Corps uses a “public interest balancing test (Murchison 2005:
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297).” This process uses case-specific measures to evaluate “the probable impacts, including
cumulative impact, of the proposed activity and its intended use on the public interest (as quoted
in Murchison 2005: 297).” Murchison describes the complexity of this process by listing the
various factors the Corps must consider when performing a public interest balancing test,
Conservation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental concerns,
wetlands, historic properties, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards,
floodplain values, land use, navigation, shore erosion and accretion,
recreation, water supply and conservation, water quality, energy needs,
safety, food and fiber production, mineral needs, considerations of property
ownership and, in general, the needs and welfare of the people (Moreno
2010: 297).”

He continues to argue that this process gives the Corps permit-writers immense individual
discretion in the enforcement of the CWA.
One of the biggest struggles the Corps faces in its enforcement of the CWA is the
problem of jurisdiction. The nature of the activities the 404 permits cover and the water bodies
typically affected by it often exist within the realm of private property. As a result there has been
a large number of court cases contesting the constitutionality of Corps regulation, their
jurisdiction over wetlands in particular. Andreen (2004) emphasizes this point, “disputes… arise
out of the program’s jurisdiction over the use and development of wetland areas, thousands of
acres of which remain in private hands (550).”
One of the most significant cases in recent events has been the court’s decision to limit
the definition of “navigable waters” in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (Andreen 2004). By limiting the definition of this term to no longer
include isolated bodies of water, the courts limited the jurisdiction of the Corps. This decision
has, consequently, caused the extensive loss of wetlands due to unregulated dumping of dredged
and fill material in isolated areas (Adler 2010).
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While the Corps and the EPA function on a federal level, the actual regulation and
inspection that is the enforcement of the CWA occurs on a local level through state
environmental agency officials. Research into policy enforcement show that “states conduct 8090% of all compliance inspections in a delegated or approved program state (Mackenthum and
Bregman 1992, 225).” While federal and state agencies often work together well, many studies
have documented problems with the relationship among the levels of enforcement (Lieber 1975,
Mintz 1995).
The EPA and the environmental legislation of the United States was created during a time
when “states were widely derided as mired in corruption, hostile to innovation, and unable to
take a serious role in environmental policy out of fear of alienating key economic constituencies
(Rabe 2006: 34).” In the decades since this perception has shifted in favor of more decentralized
regulation, primarily because of political trends criticizing too much power in the hands of the
federal government. The relationship between the EPA and state agencies under the CWA can be
considered conjoint federalism, “in which state and federal authority blend and apply
concurrently to the objects of regulation (Fiorino 1995: 85).” Within the CWA especially,
national policy guides state actions but the “EPA can revoke the state’s authority if it judges the
states’ program to be inadequate (Fiorino 1995: 85).”
States responsibilities under the CWA have important implications for its success. States
do the majority of the water monitoring, for example, which is essential to establish ambient
water quality standards and assess any changes in water quality. Although the EPA has some
guidelines for what water quality standards must do, the “requirements are vague and cursory,
leaving the design of monitoring programs primarily to individual states (Adler, Landman and
Cameron 1993: 130).” States also regulate non-point discharge, which is pollution that comes
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from complex, decentralized sources like urban or agricultural runoff. The federal government
does not have a regulatory plan to deal with non-point discharge, so the states must design them.
State environmental agencies, like the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation,
therefore play a tremendously important role in enforcing and actualizing the CWA.
To account for the gaps in water quality standards created by the BAT guidelines and
national effluent standards, the CWA also mandates the creation and use of water quality
standards in the permitting process. These standards are determined by state agencies and, “while
the effluent limitations focus on the composition of the waste stream as it flows out of the
discharge pipe, water quality standards focus on the overall quality of the receiving water
(Andreen 2004: 548).” The permits, therefore, are based upon the abilities of the industry and
technology to produce the least amount of pollution possible as well as the ability of the affected
waterway to absorb pollution emitted.
State and local environmental agencies are expected to set water quality standards for
waterways in their jurisdiction. They are to be based on designated uses for that waterway and
regional ambient water standards (Fiorino 1995). Once these water standards are defined for a
waterway they are transferred into total maximum daily loads (TMDLs). TMDLs are defined
levels of pollutants that would hinder that waterway’s ability to function in its designated uses or
that would further degrade the overall water quality. The EPA approves the creation of these
standards and the “states must review their standards every three years and submit any changes
to EPA for approval (Fiorino 1995: 29).”
Another important consideration in the CWA permitting process is the use of
antidegradation policies. These policies are far less defined by the EPA and are often left to the
state agencies. Antidegradation policies are important to protect waters not yet degraded by
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pollution, even though only .4 percent of river miles in the United States are not considered
degraded by EPA standards (Fiorino 1995). Moreover, “the antidegradation policy must also
provide for some, more limited, protection of other waters where quality exceeds the level
needed to protect existing uses (Healy 1997: 401).” Very few states have clearly defined
programs for including antidegradation policy into their permitting process and it remains
neglected in federal statutes.
To monitor the progress of CWA permitting programs the Act outlines the use of water
quality reports from the EPA and state agencies as well as compliance and self-monitoring
reports from the regulated dischargers. Section 305(b) of the CWA requires states to submit to
EPA an analysis of water quality in the state every two years. The EPA then analyzes the reports
and submits a synthesized version to Congress in the form of a National Water Quality Inventory
every two years (Fiorino 1995). The basis of these analyses are the same water quality standards
created by the state agencies for permitting. They are based on each waterways designated uses
and criteria designed to protect those uses. In the reports, waterways are designated as fully
supporting, partially supporting or not supporting its particular designated uses. The compliance
and self-monitoring system consists of reports regularly filed by the facilities, which are
collected and supervised by the state agencies (Andreen 2004). These reports are then compared
with regular inspections by the state officials every two or five years (Fiorino 1995).
Permitting activities and water quality monitoring and reporting are primarily the
responsibility of state agencies. Low-level bureaucrats like the TDEC employees I interviewed
do the work to make these programs a reality. However, there is a system of checks and balances
structured into the CWA to maintain national consistency in enforcement. The activities of
states, like Tennessee, are overseen by federal entities like the EPA or performed in conjunction
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with activities of entities like the Army Corps of Engineers. While this provides oversight it also
creates conflicts within the implementation of the CWA. It is within this complex network of
cooperation and administration that the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation
is situated.

The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation
The history of environmental regulation in Tennessee dates back to 1937 when the state
officially established a Department of Conservation and created its Parks System (Tennessee
Secretary of State 2011). In 1945 the state’s General Assembly created the Stream Pollution
Control Board and Tennessee became the first state in the South to pass a water pollution control
law. Additionally, a few decades later,
Tennessee was experiencing severe environmental problems, particularly in its urban
areas. Large stretches of rivers, such as the Ocoee, were “dead.” Air quality in
Chattanooga was so bad that drivers had to use their headlights during the day, and in
Nashville visibility was reduced to less than 100 yards on particularly bad days. A suite
of state and federal environmental laws were passed beginning in the late 1960s to
address these massive problems (Tennessee Secretary of State 2011: 192).

The regulatory framework also paralleled the development of the Federal Environmental
Protection Agency and various environmental policies at the time. The Tennessee Department of
Environment and Conservation (TDEC) in its modern form was not established until 1991, when
the Department of Conservation and the Department of Health and Environment were combined
(Tennessee Secretary of State 2011).
The Department now has more than 2,900 employees working in eight field offices
across Tennessee (Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation 2013). Of these
employees, 56 percent work in the State Parks, while 44 percent work in environmental
protection programs and administration (Tennessee Department of Environment and
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Conservation 2013). The environmental protection programs of TDEC regulate sources of air
pollution, water pollution, solid and hazardous waste, radiological health issues, underground
storage tanks, water supply, and groundwater (Tennessee Department of Environment and
Conservation 2013). The CWA is, obviously, actualized within the Department’s water quality
programs.
Within TDEC’s water quality department there are several program areas. The Division
of Water Supply supervises activities that involve public water supplies, their construction and
operation. The Division of Ground Water Protection (DGWP) regulates wastewater disposal,
focusing especially on activities that threaten underground water sources. Finally, the Division of
Water Pollution Control (DWPC) is responsible for regulating any activity that discharges
pollution into Tennessee Waters. This division operates primarily under the Tennessee Water
Quality Control Act (TWCA) and the federal CWA (Tennessee Department of Environment and
Conservation 2013).
The DWPC is a large division, with multiple programs and responsibilities. The state’s
Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) Program operates within this division, identifying
pollutants, their sources, and directing pollution control activities. The DWPC also includes a
Storm Water Program that addresses runoff problems in the state of Tennessee. Also, the state’s
Watershed Management program is subsumed in the DWPC. Finally, the Division also includes
the state’s Mining Program, which regulates any non-coal mining activity and illegal coal mining
that has not been permitted by the Federal Office of Surface mining. The Mining Program is
included in the DWPC because it focuses primarily on water discharge permitting from mining
sites. Although it also includes mine inspecting and operates the Abandoned Mine Land
Reclamation Program (Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation 2013).
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The regulators I interviewed and observed are all employees of TDEC’s Knoxville Field
Office. The Knoxville Field Office is responsible for monitoring and regulating facilities in 16
counties in East Tennessee. The interviewees regulatory and enforcement activities ranged from
monitoring facilities and writing permits to meeting with corporations, community groups, and
legislators. The majority of them work in the DWPC or the DGWP, but a few were in
management positions in the Field Office itself.
The principal tool for water regulation in TDEC’s programs is the permitting process, this
primarily consists of NPDES permits and 404/ARAP permits (Tennessee Department of
Environment and Conservation 2013). These permits are written and distributed according to
CWA guidelines. While they are primarily written on the local level by TDEC regulators in the
nearest Field Office to the permittee, they often require coordination or approval by the federal
EPA, OSM, or Army Corps of Engineers as designated by the CWA.

It is clear that, like other national policies, Clean Water Act implementation and
enforcement is not a simple procedure. The bureaucratic processes that govern the actualization
of this policy make an analysis of its successes and failures difficult. The next chapter is an
analysis of the interviews and observations I completed in the spring of 2011 with environmental
regulators in TDEC’s Knoxville Field Office. Although this is a small picture of the huge
endeavor that is the CWA, it will provide an alternative lens for examining how this policy is
enforced and what social factors may be affecting it on the most local level. The next chapter
will, finally, examine the major findings of my case study, illuminating the experiences and
perspectives of those individuals who enforce water quality laws.
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Chapter Five
Enforcement of the CWA:
Expectations, Realities, and Rationalizations
In this chapter, I present my data analysis, identifying the three major themes that
represent the perceptions and experiences of the regulators who enforce the CWA in the
Knoxville Field Office: regulators’ desire to do good work, the contradictions and constraints
that regulators feel impair their ability to do good work, and the methods collectively developed
by regulators to cope with the contradictions and constraints they experience.
Desire to do good work
The first theme expressed by the environmental regulators was the desire to do good
work, protecting people and the environment. They articulated this theme in three motifs: their
belief in the importance of their work, their pride in working for the people, and their
appreciation of nature.
Belief in the Importance of their Work
Whether they were happy with their job or not, almost all of the individuals I interviewed
shared the belief that their work was important. One of the regulators expressed very clearly why
he believed in the work he did and the CWA,
I think water quality would degrade without regulations. Are you familiar with the
tragedy of the commons? Is that a phrase you’ve heard? The idea comes from, its, um, I
think it was a paper initially, if you had a common grazing area and everybody put their
cattle on it, one farmer would have incentive to put one more head of cattle on that
grazing land than it could really sustain, but for him in the short term there’s a lot of
benefit. So I think that people would say, I think water quality would slowly degrade
over time, people would think I can pollute just a little bit more or just this once and get
away with it and they probably could if there weren’t regulations (Interview 9).

He was not the only regulator to reference the “tragedy of the commons.” The regulators
consistently expressed that their work was important because if they, or the government, did not
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regulate environmentally destructive activities, no one else would. They shared an understanding
that their jobs and the policies they enforced provided an important service.
Another regulator expressed frustration over criticism that the CWA and their regulation
was unnecessary,
If you want to see what it used to look like, go take these regulators away, and make the
mental assumption that people generally tend to do the right thing, that you don’t have to
have somebody who makes a rule. I wish they did and I think it’s a nice thing to say and I
would love to believe that too. But all you got to do is go away from a facility that has a
permit and don’t inspect it for two years and come back and see what you find when you
get back. You think it’s going to be humming along efficiently just like it was when you
inspected in once a month. You are mistaken, that never happens, I wish that it did but it
doesn’t (Interview 7).

Again, this regulator is expressing the importance of their work and defending the value of their
positions as enforcers of the CWA. That same regulator went on to explain why he, and others,
continue to work as environmental regulators for the government even though they are not paid
well,
You feel like you are doing something that matters instead of making pet rocks, that’s
why people stay here for so long (Interview 7).

This was a sentiment expressed in many of the interviews.
Nearly all of the regulators acknowledged that they do not get paid well for their work,
but that the benefits outweighed the financial concerns. One regulator explained to me in a
conversation about why he chose to work for the government rather than as an environmental
consultant in private industry that he felt better about the work he would do here. As he said,
it’s a good job, I like what I do. Um, I’m working for the good guys (Interview 9).

This belief is important for the regulators in the work that they do. They are often caught in
conflicts over land use, development, and environmental protection and they subsequently take a
lot of criticism. Despite the criticism, they all seemed to hold fast to the belief that they were
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doing the right thing and that their job was important. Another regulator explained the big picture
of why they do their work,
[The] only reason why we enforce is that we’re protecting the environment for everybody
else, who we work for (Interview 8).

Pride in Working for the People
Although the regulators I interviewed primarily work the regulated industry and focus on
environmental criteria, a trend throughout all of the interviews was an understanding that they
were employees of the state and therefore a servant of the people. Moreover, there was a sense of
pride in this position. As one regulator put it,
I have to be a government employee first. I am by definition anywhere I go and anything
I do I am representing the commissioner (Interview 6).

Many of the regulators shared this belief. Echoing the sentiment in the previous section, in many
of the interviews there was a sense of pride in their role as civil servants. Many of the regulators
conceptualized their role as protectors of the environment,
I think we have to remember that we are civil servants we are working for the people of
the state of Tennessee. We’re trying to; you’re trying to make sure that everyone is
protected. That people who own property and resources have access to those property
and resources. You’re also trying to make sure that everybody has clean water, that is
fishable, swimmable, drinkable, and that they can enjoy those resources (Interview 2).

This individual seems to frame his work in the understanding that they provide an important
service to the people of Tennessee. This valorization of their work is important in that it provides
an incentive to do their jobs well, it creates a sense of responsibility.
In the case of the environmental regulators I interviewed, the understanding that they
were working for the people is broadened even more to include themselves. The shared nature of
the environment they protect makes it so they are actually working for themselves. They are
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protecting the waters of the state for the citizens, including the regulators and their families who
also live in the area. As one of the regulators stated,
This is waters of the state. Its just as much your water as it is mine and so here we work
for the government but in essence we’re also working for ourselves because these are our
waters that we need to protect (interview 8).

This provides an incentive to do their work well that may not be present in other public service
workers who do not directly benefit from the work they do. The fact that their work protects the
citizens of Tennessee and their own families from environmental hazards is especially important
to the regulators I interviewed. In addition to the desire to protect natural resources for the health
and wellbeing of their families and communities, nearly all of them expressed a general
appreciation and love of nature.

Appreciation of Nature
One of the most consistent themes in my interviews was the sense that these individuals
had an appreciation of nature. Whether it was an affinity for outside activities, fascination with
the natural world, or just an understanding of the links between human and environmental health,
all of the regulators expressed appreciation in some way during our interviews and observations.
While I was in the field the regulator I was with took time to show me several spots in the rural
area outside of Knoxville we were visiting where the wetlands were protected and still in good
condition. He stopped the car and we stood for several minutes enjoying the scene. It was clear
to me he was a person who appreciated and valued nature.
When I asked the interviewees why they got into environmental work many of them
expressed some appreciation or love for the outdoors. For example, a regulator explained to me
why he wanted to work in environmental protection,
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Well one thing I really, I think part of what steered me in the direction that I pursued is
my love of the outdoors and being outside and my curiosity of life (Interview 3)

Similarly, another regulator told me how he was inspired to work in environmental regulation as
a result of being outside a lot growing up,
I guess you know, just being outdoors and sorts I saw a lot of things in the environment
that concerned me and hurt a lot of things and I wanted to know more about it and just
wanted to be outdoors and take part in that I guess. It’s important to me. Environment and
clean environment, clean water and um, I just love outdoors and nature and so it just kind
of ended up being the direction I took (Interview 12).

Many of the regulators indicated that they have had a lifelong affinity for the natural world. For
example,
Well I’ve always kind of been in, enjoyed the environment through scouts and stuff like
that but just really wanting to protect um, well concerned with the environment and
protecting the environment (Interview 11).

This consistent expression also came up in other areas of the interviews as well. When I
asked about the best part of their jobs, many of them felt it was simply being able to be outside
while they worked. Not only did most of them appreciate the larger value of environmental
protection, but they just enjoyed being outside,
Since being a little tyke I’ve always enjoyed being outside and being in the woods, trees
fascinated me. And that’s sort of stuck, all the jobs that I’ve ever had were outdoors
(Interview 5)

Another regulator answered the question about the best part of his job in a different, but still
similar way,
The best part about my job is basically seeing these areas that have been abused, restored.
Um, and seeing life coming back into these systems (Interview 3).

The value of his work, the best part of his job, is seeing that improvement in the environment. He
was not the only individual to identify seeing improvement in the environment as a source of
encouragement and pride.
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This appreciation of the natural world, as I said earlier, was present in all of the
interviews in some form. Some were more enthusiastic than others, but in general all of the
individuals I interviewed appreciated the environment that they were protecting. This seemed to
be an important common factor for employees of the Field Office and an important indication
that they all had at least some desire to do their job well. As one of the regulators put it,
I’m concerned about a lot of things for our country and our environmental regulations is
one of them its not, you know, a coincidence that I work doing that (interview 9).

It is not a coincidence that they do this work. Some of them did come to their positions
accidentally, but they all emphasized the value of the work they do in protecting the natural
environment.
Among the regulators I interviewed, the shared appreciation of the natural world, their
pride in working for the people, and their belief in the importance of their work all indicate that
they have a desire to do their work as best as they can. Despite this desire though, the reality of
their capacity to protect water quality is often tempered by social and bureaucratic constraints.
As Lipsky (1980) points out in his analysis of street-level bureaucrats in other agencies,
“typically they do not claim that they are doing a perfect job, or performing the way the job
should be performed; only that they are functioning effectively and properly under the
constraints they encounter (82).” The regulators I interviewed were no different. The next section
presents several themes that highlight the constraints and contradictions they face in their daily
work.

Contradictions and Constraints
Despite the regulators’ desire to do a good job, they feel that bureaucratic contradictions
and constraints impair their ability to do so. Bureaucratic contradictions and constraints
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constitute the second theme expressed in interviews. Regulators articulated the theme in four
motifs: inadequate resources, paperwork overload, contradictory expectations and goals, and
bureaucratic policy constraints. These constraints characterize the reality of the work performed
by street-level environmental regulators.

Inadequate Resources
Throughout all of my interviews an acknowledgement of inadequate resources was
addressed either directly or implicitly. It was a universal fact for these regulators that their task,
protecting the waters of the state, was a huge undertaking in first place. In addition to that reality,
most of them also expressed frustration with inadequate resources. Some of them talked about
the lack of funding, in general,
I think overall, all states are getting much less federal funding (Interview 13).

One regulator, who had formerly worked for the EPA and had a perspective on Tennessee’s
funding situation compared to other states, explained to me that this is especially an issue in
Tennessee,
Funding [in Tennessee] was, without income tax, was always an issue (Interview 4).

Tennessee’s lack of taxes and an ongoing pressure for the federal government to limit the
amount of money they offer to states for their regulatory activities leads to state agencies
attempting to do the most work possible with the least amount of resources.
Unfortunately, the lowest level workers, like those I interviewed, whose responsibilities
are already difficult, most often feel those cutbacks. When I asked one of the regulators if they
made regular visits to all the waterways in their jurisdiction to test for water quality, she
explained to me that doing that would be impossible.

	
  

45	
  

No we do it for all of the ones that are listed on the 303d list and some others, but not all
streams in our area, there are just too many for us to actually physically go monitor
(Interview 12).

The 303d list is a list of all of the waterways in the state that have been deemed “not supporting”
one or more of their determined uses, such as fishing or swimming. So the regulators are not able
to go to all of the streams, they just focus on the ones that they know need to be monitored. From
their point of view they are starting their work understanding that assessing and monitoring all
the waterways of their region to ensure water quality standards is impossible.
Another regulator expressed the reality of this to me in a discussion about the diffuse
environmental problems facing the region,
A lot of it, a lot of the stuff cannot, its not going to be remedied. And that, you know,
money as far as buying equipment, hiring personnel, all that stuff is going to be limited
(Interview 2)

It is generally accepted by these regulators that they are working towards a distant goal with
inadequate resources. This is made even more difficult as new programs and policies are
implemented, increasing their workloads, adding paperwork, or creating time restrictions on their
permitting activities.
On top of their already nearly impossible task, the regulators indicated that their
responsibilities always seem to be increasing. One of the regulators explained his frustration to
me,
The worst part of my job is that we tend to be understaffed in that our jobs get very
compartmentalized, and this is probably a uniform problem across the department, is that
your workload is changing, getting greater each day and you’re having to diversify on
some things that you do and having to overspecialize in others, and the administrative
aspects, you know, getting this report out getting this paper out, trying to meet a thirty
day deadline. You have thirty days from when you start a permit to get a response back to
the applicant to let them know that their permit is sufficient or not (Interview 2)
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As a result of being understaffed, being expected to do more work, and having to do more
administrative duties in the process many of the regulators acknowledge that the quality of the
work they are doing suffers.
Another regulator expressed his frustration with the expectations of the permitting
process,
The permit process is getting very involved, its, I mean its literally, trying to write a
permit its almost like doing a research paper every time um, and, which is good in a
sense, but its, you know, its we have a pressure from, you know there is a law that we
have thirty days to review a permit and get it out (Interview 11).

The particulars of what is included in an NPDES or an ARAP permit, which operate under the
CWA, is determined by both TDEC and the EPA. These particulars are subject to change and
more often than not the changes mean more work for the individuals doing inspections and
writing permits. While this is a good thing for the stringency of the permits, these additional
expectations do not come with additional resources so it further stretches the capacity of the
regulators on the local level.
Although many of the regulators admit the need for new legislation and policy to make
water protection more efficient, they also are hesitant because they are aware of budget
constraints. In a discussion about the need for new legislation and policy to regulate non-point
discharge of pollution, the kind that results from diffuse and hard to regulate sources like storm
water runoff from cities, development, and agriculture, one of the regulators expressed his
concern about the reality of getting the resources necessary to do that. He was concerned that
allocating resources towards that would take them from the already limited budget for existing
regulation of point-source dischargers, like industries and factories,
We’re all state, city and federal budgets are overstressed because we keep passing new
things and every guy out here is, as cheap as they work, has to have a cubicle has to
have a building has to have a vehicle, has to have a computer, and that adds up. I don’t
know. We have to morph into something that meets the modern challenges somehow
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without letting industry go back to the way that they were, but I don’t know how to do it
(interview 7).

This particular regulator was also in a management position, so he had more insight into the big
picture of resources needed for the field office to function.
Nearly all of the regulators were aware of the vast amount of resources needed for their
operations: money, employees, and time. Unfortunately, they also expressed frustration with a
lack of those necessary resources. The dearth of resources, especially their own time, meant for
the regulators that they could not do their job as well as they would like. This often was
articulated in terms of frustration with many of their bureaucratic duties, like extensive paper
work and following convoluted processes, which took time away from other, more important
regulatory activities.
Paperwork Overload
As a result of inadequate resources many of the regulators are expected to perform more
work with less time. Their time, therefore, becomes very valuable. From many of the interviews
I gleaned a sense of frustration with the amount of time they spend in the office, following
mandated procedures, and filling out paperwork. When I asked one of the regulators about how
often they get out in the field, he explained that he only gets out in extreme situations,
Most of my time is spent in the office now. And the few times I do get to go out into the
field it’s usually to resolve a dispute between a contractor and one of my guys or a
contractor and landowner. We get caught up in the paperwork (Interview 5).

He clearly identifies the paperwork they have to do, documenting their activities for
organizational purposes, as a reason for him having to stay in the office rather than being in the
field. Similarly, another individual told me about how his job had changed over the years, now
having to do more busy, office work,
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[I spend] too much time in front of the computer. I used to be in the field more, but um, I
come in and review correspondences, review DMRs (discharge monitoring reports), that
are, lets see, the industry sends in to us, um, take a few problem phone calls, schedule
inspections, review permits, sit back and reflect on what am I going to write in this
position paper on gold dredging, generally far more office work than it used to be. I used
to be out in the field probably 75 or 80 percent of the time and now that is flip flopped
(Interview 6).

For some of the regulators, this was because they had changed their position, doing more
managerial tasks rather than field inspection. Even when I asked about this many of them felt
they were just expected to do more and more office and paper work for their jobs than they had
before.
One regulator who worked in the reclamation division, cleaning up old mining sites was
irritated because of the time constraints on his work as a result of bureaucratic processes and
paperwork,
Why can’t we move any faster on a project than we do? That’s one of the aspects I guess
I could have talked about when you asked what I don’t like about my job. If we identify
a high priority site it may be six or eight months before we can get on that site with
equipment with all of the administrative requirements and environmental requirements.
The public has a hard time understanding that. Matter of fact, I have a hard time
understanding that. But I do know that I get in trouble if I don’t comply (Interview 5)

Although they were frustrated with these processes, most of the regulators know that it is a
necessary part of their work in a government agency.
Acknowledging that paperwork and office time are part of their job does not prevent
them from criticizing these expectations. Especially because the implications of those demands,
is that they cannot spend as much time in the field making inspections of facilities for permits or
monitoring general water quality. As a result of this limitations state governments, like
Tennessee, are increasingly making use of self-reporting processes to monitor facilities. This
means that each site or facility regularly submits reports to TDEC but actual regulators only visit
the actual sites intermittently.
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As one regulator told me, relying on self-reporting of facilities for writing permits is
really problematic and does not instill an urgency of compliance in the regulated facilities,
I think if we were able to do more inspections and get out there more, more of the
developers would realize “they’re coming out, they’re checking this, we’ve got to put
this stuff up.” We need to be more active out in the field, that is what we need to do
(Interview 8).

She worked in the construction and storm water division, so writing permits primarily consists of
reviewing construction and development plans, usually without actually visiting the area. She
makes a very strong point and continues on to explain the difficulty of trying to write effective
permits from a distance,
We review plans, [but] most of the time I may never even make it out to the sites most
of the time we don’t even deal with people. So, I, from that aspect I don’t see how you
can really regulate and enforce if you are not able to go out to sites (Interview 8).

This was another of the most salient themes throughout the interviews, the desire to be out of the
office and visiting more sites for inspection or monitoring. However, the reality of functioning in
a bureaucracy means paperwork and following procedures. This is exacerbated in a bureaucracy
facing simultaneous resource depletion and increasing responsibilities, as their already large
workloads and schedules are stretched even further.
The pressures the regulators feel to be in the office when they feel their time is better
spent elsewhere is an example of how the expectations of their work can be contradictory. They
are simultaneously supposed to be in the office keeping up those duties, while also effectively
protecting water quality across their jurisdiction. The next section elaborates on how the
regulators experience these contradictory expectations.
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Contradictory Expectations and Goals
In my conversations with the regulators, it was clear to me that these individuals, their
citizen-clients, and the various agencies involved had very different ideas about what the goals
and expectations of their work should be. One of the defining characteristics of the low level
bureaucrat is that they are the face of government policy for the people. As a result, they often
have to bear the brunt of the citizen’s frustrations with government. As Lipsky (1980) puts it,
they often experience “tension between primarily focusing on individuals and primarily focusing
on social-objectives (42).”
This is a difficult position for individuals to be in, and this was a theme I found
throughout my interviews. As the regulators navigated their position as servants of the people,
they often found that they not could fulfill their expectations. One regulator tried to explain this
to me in terms of the types of complaints they receive,
We receive a lot of complaints that we really can’t help people with and um, they expect
that because we are with the government, with the state, that we have um, more or less
unlimited powers and we don’t. So, those people are not always happy and um, I don’t
have a way to make them happy. So, a lot of, a lot of complaints and issues that we get
involved in have to do with zoning and we’re not a zoning agency (Interview 10).

Many citizens do not have an in-depth understanding of how public agencies are organized and
they may not necessarily understand which agency they should contact to deal with their
complaints. This is a result of the complexity of bureaucratic functioning, everything is sectioned
and compartmentalized with very little room for flexibility. The organization of bureaucracies
like TDEC can be difficult to navigate for lay citizens, which leads to frustration for both citizenclients and TDEC employees.
According to the regulators though, this does not stop them from criticizing TDEC
employees. Their expectation of the DEC is that it should be able to help them with their
environmental issues. As another regulator put it,
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They’re going to be unhappy with TDEC because there’s a connection. Well TDEC
regulates mining and I’m unhappy with that mine even if the water quality coming off
that mine associated with that mine is perfect, um, and it often is. (Interview 9).

He was referring to citizens who expect the regulators to be able to control mining activity in the
state. In Tennessee, though, mining permits are given out by federal agencies, OSM and EPA.
TDEC employees are only allowed to regulate the mining sites in terms of their discharges into
waters of the state under the CWA, which they are promulgated.
The complexity of how this regulation works can be difficult for citizens to maneuver,
and often they become critical of the regulators for not being able to do more. He continued to
explain this point further,
We get calls from the public saying, you know, there’s this new quarry blasting at 4 in
the morning and it wakes me up. Well, as much as I sympathize with that person and I
wouldn’t want blasting in my neighborhood at 4 in the morning that’s not water quality,
so we don’t do that (Interview 9).

This creates a tension between the expectations of the citizens and the reality of the regulators
capacities, which strains the relations between the regulators and the community they work in.
Additionally, many of the regulators explained to me that the public often only conceives
of environmental problems in terms of how they relate to them personally, not the big picture of
environmental goals. One of the regulators explained how this conflict can be problematic for
regulatory activities when the citizens work together to achieve what they believe the goals of
environmental protection should be,
If they make enough accusations or file enough complaints they can shift our focus to
things and, that’s on their radar but not necessarily the most important thing. I had one
staff member say to me “I’m going to little bitty campfires and I’ve got a roaring brush
fire that’s turned into a giant forest fire out here in these other counties but their not part
of the area that this environmental group’s looking at” so he was frustrated and it makes
me frustrated that we’re not getting the most protection accomplished, you know,
addressed because the, um some environmental groups are focusing on a given area or
project or complaint and not the environment as a whole (Interview 13).
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It is difficult for the regulators to deal with this type of problem in their regulatory activities,
especially with their inadequate resources. From their point of view, the citizen’s pressure takes
resources away from what the regulators see as valuable.
To combat this conflict in expectations, many of the regulators expressed desire for more
education of the citizens so they would have a better understanding of how regulation worked
and more realistic expectations for the regulators. For example, one regulator told me
That’s a big part of this, just making sure that everyone really sees the same picture and,
and appreciates whether we’re capable of doing some of the things that they’d like to see
done or, or how we might be capable of doing some of those things (Interview 10)

However, even with a better understanding of the regulations, there still may be conflict. Lipsky
(2010) argues that this type of conflict is inherent in public service agencies because there will
always be that expectation for personalized, specialized services from the citizen-clients but
bureaucratic public agencies will always seek to standardize their service as much as possible.
Additionally, with the increasing workloads they face, environmental regulators
experience ongoing and increasing conflict. This sentiment is exemplefied in one of my
interviews with a regulator who had worked in the Field Office for many years,
[The way the people view us] used to be good. It’s just deteriorated, um, their
expectations have gotten so high um, it’s just to an unachievable level. We used to be
regarded with more respect more as an ally you know, to come out and help people with
their complaints. We generally could do something for them you know, even if it wasn’t
perfect they were at least grateful that we tried to help. And now like I said, expectations
are real high about what you can do and there seems to be a lot of suspicion of
government and maybe in many cases justifiably so but in many ways it just permeates
the whole, relationships and is unjustified a lot of times (Interview 13).

Many of the regulators reflections on citizen expectations of their work acknowledge that they
are not totally unjustified. The individuals I interviewed were aware that the bureaucratic
expectations of their work are detached from the reality of how people experienced
environmental problems.
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When I asked how the EPA measures the success of their programs under the CWA, the
most consistent response was that they relied on data, numbers, or “bean counting.” Whether it
was the number of permits issued, amount of compliance recorded, or the number of streams
listed as “impaired” in the 303d lists, there was a shared understanding that the only way the
agencies could keep track of progress was to run the numbers. As one regulator put it,
Most government agencies and I don’t want to exclude the state from that too, its mostly
bean counting, mostly the number of acres, stream miles, its production (interview 5).

As a result of this measurement focus, the regulators and the field office are measured according
to these numbers as well. This puts pressure on them to put out those numbers, which leads to a
focus on quantity over quality and leaves very little room for the personalized service that
citizens expect.
Another aspect of the bureaucratic structure that can create conflicting goals and
expectations within the agency is its top-down approach to agenda setting. As the upper level
management of both the state and federal agencies that oversee the activities of the regulators
change, so too does the focus of those agencies that provide the funding for the regulatory work
of the Field Office Employees. As one regulator put it,
EPA’s measure of success is – it moves more. It may change with whoever is there at any
particular time as their staff changes, the different leadership has and the staff may
change what their priorities are (Interview 2)

A change in priorities can mean a change the programs that the regulators work under which can
be frustrating as these changes affect their activities in a way that they see as less efficient. Many
of the regulators are critical of this top down approach because, as one regulator explained the
inefficiency of new regulatory requirements,
The people asking for them never ran the test (Interview 2).
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He was referring to a recent mandate by the EPA that all NPDES permits must now include tests
for conductivity. This is an additional test that examines how quickly electrical currents move
through a water sample in order to measure the level of dissolved solids in the water which
contribute to water degradation. Several of the regulators believed it to be an unnecessary and
expensive test that does not give them any additional information about water quality.
Their frustration with this mandate in another example of how conflict over goals and
expectation can occur within a bureaucratic agency. The organization creates a standardized way
of measuring a piece of water quality and focuses on that measure, rather than the larger picture
of water quality. This is an example of goal displacement, when the smaller bureaucratic
processes, like measuring conductivity, become more important than the end goal, in the case
water quality. This occurs often in bureaucracies because of their strict emphasis on following
the rules and regulations of the organization.
Bureaucratic and Policy Constraints
Throughout the interviews, the regulators emphasized that all of their activities strictly
followed bureaucratic guidelines as to what they could and could not do under the law. What was
especially interesting about this theme was the contradictory way that the regulators would talk
about them. In one sense they express frustration with the constraints over their abilities to
regulate environmentally hazardous activities. Then in another sense they defend them as the
most legitimate and fair way of protecting the environment, valorizing and justifying their work
while also ideologically separating it from the work done by nonprofit or citizen groups. This
section focuses on the frustration the regulators experienced. The next section addresses the
contradictions in their understanding of them.
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As I have already shown, these regulators care about the environment and want to do
their job as best they can. However, the policies they enforce constrain how they are able to do
this. As one regulator expressed to me,
Well, my job here is to protect the environment of course and we do that through laws
and regulations, um, so um, we have bounds on, on how we um, apply those laws and
regulations so, and we’re guided by them (Interview 10).

While they accept the reality of these constraints, the bounds that guide how they regulate and
protect the environment can be difficult for them to deal with. One of the regulators in the
mining section articulated a similar sentiment,
If you ask me my take is that its not a good idea to surface mine for coal in 2011 we
should have been away from that 25 years ago. And its not illegal and until you make it
illegal, its their coal and they bought it and they can mine that coal on their property if
they want to. I do not have the authority and neither do you to tell them that they can’t.
Anymore than I can’t tell you that you can’t build a house on the land you bought. What
we can say, we do have the right to say what you can and can’t discharge into our waters
and that’s where the line is (Interview 7).

Again he is referring to TDEC’s limited ability to regulate coal mining activities. While he
believes that coal mining is not a good thing for overall environmental quality, according to the
legislation he works under all he is able to do is regulate their water discharges. Many of the
regulators indicated that the legislation and policies that they worked under were either out of
date, or inefficient.
For example, the federal CWA does not have a coherent framework for addressing nonpoint discharge, which is one of the biggest threats to water quality across the nation. As a result
the state and local regulators are left to create a framework for regulating storm water runoff
from construction, development, urbanization, and agriculture. One of the regulators who work
in the storm water runoff program conveyed her frustration to me about how inefficient their
program is,
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If you don’t address it from land use and planning, the water quality control laws by
themselves own cannot do it, they will be fighting, there’s got to be something more at
the root of it all and that’s one frustrating thing we don’t control that, we react to it, and
that’s what’s frustrating because we have enough knowledge to know that if its not taken
care of it at that level, we’re doomed (laughs)… they’re coming around I just hope its not
too late when they do it (Interview 13).

Although they are doing their best to regulate and catch up with developers whose activities
create sediment and chemical runoff that significantly affects water quality, the framework they
are using offers them very little leverage to do anything effective.
While storm water runoff regulation is an issue with policy and process, many of the
regulators also criticized national and state policy that attempts to standardize and control their
regulatory activities. In Lipsky’s (2010) model of the street-level bureaucracy he argues that
these individuals see each case and are aware of how each is unique because they meet the
people and know their backgrounds, therefore it is difficult for them to treat them all the same.
During my time in the field, for example, we visited two rural sewage treatment facilities
maintained by a local man in his early 70’s. The regulator I was with knew him from previously
working together, he also knew the man had suffered from a stroke barely a year earlier. The
second facility we inspected was not up to compliance. It was clear from our inspection of the
discharge pipe and samples of the water coming from it, that the facility was no longer doing its
job. The failure of the facility could have been a result of its age, lack of upkeep or the
undocumented dumping of leachate liquid from the local landfill into the facility. Whatever the
cause, the department protocol for this situation requires a notice of violation.
The regulator I was with did not want to write up a notice of violation for the site, he
knew the older man could not afford to lose his job and was the sole earner for his family. The
regulator also knew that the facility was going to be shut down in favor of the school linking up
with a municipal sewage system in a few months. The notice of violation would most likely not
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be delivered until after the facility is shut down and may cost the man his job. The regulator
wrote down the information in the field, and expressed his frustration with the process. I still do
not know what he chose to do, but it was clear that policy dictates with all of the rules and
regulations are often difficult to enforce in the field where each case is unique.
The environmental regulators I interviewed know that each stream or water body they
monitor is a unique case, biologically, geographically, historically, and socially. As a result,
many were critical of standardizing measures forced upon them. For example, one regulator told
me how the agency expectations of his analysis of streams has changed over time,
The way we used to do it, our studies were you know specially crafted to the individual
stream. Now you’ve got an ecoregion approach that you’re looking at so, you know, it’s
kind of more standardized across the state (Interview 2).

While the ecoregion approach is designed to standardize regulatory and water quality evaluation
processes, making sure they are equally administrated in all areas based on regional ecological
systems, it also might sacrifice the quality of a more personalized evaluation that would better
understand the problems with that waterway and protect it more effectively.
Similarly, another regulator explained to me how illogical he thought broad-brush
standardized policy is,
Some policy advisors told some other policy advisor that you need to do it this way. And
then it comes down and they say oh well we can do it, we can make them do it this way
and then we can make everyone do it this way and we can put this study together to
show it then. Like, what size shoe do you wear? Nine eight? All of them are the same
size (laughs). Ok, its just its sort of like, the guy came in, one of the OSM field office
director came in and he says “we’ve all got out tee-shirts on and they’re all medium”
(laughs). And that’s what it is I mean, when you try to do that you’ve gotta look at it and
you’ve gotta think about and you’ve gotta have that flexibility in order to do this. Ok?
You’ve gotta have that regulatory flexibility you cant have, you cant have your hands
tied behind your back with a broad-brush national policy that one size, size eight or size
medium, fits everybody (Interview 3).

Just like it is illogical to assume all people are the same physically, it is illogical to assume that
all streams or water bodies are the same biologically. He also critiqued the way policy is created,
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indicating that those who create this standardized policy can benefit from it because it makes
measurement and evaluation easier and cheaper, but it actually makes it more difficult to achieve
the overall goal of improving water quality.
Several of the regulators I interviewed also brought up a recent change in state policy to
standardize how streams are identified, the creation of a hydrologic professional certification for
stream determinations. Streams are regulated and protected, but wet-weather conveyances (those
waterways that only flow certain days out of the year) are not. Therefore, how they are classified
has implications for water quality protection. This certification provides a standardized way for
regulators and environmental professionals to determine which category a waterway falls under
and how it will be regulated. One of the regulators explained the potential hazards of this
program to me,
I don’t think it will turn out to be exactly what they were hoping for you know. I think
they are going to get black and white answers, yes stream or no not stream in areas that
were questionable before. BPJ (best personal judgment) is gonna go out the window and
its gonna be well, I’ve reached X number whenever I go through my parameters on my
little sheet and it’s a stream and that’s going to be it, it’s a stream (Interview 2).

He is concerned because while the creation of black and white definitions of what is a stream and
what is not might be useful in a bureaucratic conceptualization of decision making, the reality of
streams is that there are a lot of complex, dynamic factors that can affect the measurements. He
felt that the model would not work well and may limit the capacity of regulators to protect water
quality if streams are now classified as wet-weather conveyances because of standardized
numbers on a sheet of paper.
The decisions to employ standardized measures to environmental regulation typically
come from upper level managers and agencies. Many of the regulators I interviewed were critical
of this flow of orders because those making the decisions are out of touch with what their
policies actually mean on the ground. As one regulator told me,
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They didn’t start at the bottom and learn how coal mining works or how you check
stream biology and what stream ecology is all about and things like this. And that’s not a
good thing for policy, you got people who work in each state who’ve been doing it for
years and who are highly skilled an experienced people and then there’s a 25 year old
who came out of Princeton that gets this job in charge of permits and things and they’re
making policy while they’re smart people and they mean well, good folks, they’re
connection with the reality at the ground level is too tenuous to make good decisions at
that level. It becomes a problem over time they become a separate thing that’s composed
entirely of people that work in Washington DC and you better keep bringing those
people in form the ground level to make decisions or you end up with this cliché of the
ivory tower mentality of people passing down stuff to the states and they have no idea
what they’re saying and how impossible what they’re saying is and why it’s a bad idea,
they’re in their own world and that’s becoming a problem (interview 7).

There was a sense in many of the interviews that upper level managers were alienated from the
reality of enforcement and regulation, therefore they often created policy that was ineffective and
wasted resources.
This sentiment is similar to the concern many of them had about not being able to be out
in the field. The less time they spend in the field the less they are aware of what environmental
conditions are really present and they lose perspective of what it really takes to enforce the
policy. As one of the regulators, who had recently been promoted to a managerial role, told me
about their experience of this transition,
Somewhere somebody’s actually got to implement that in the field and sometimes its not
really feasible, I have noticed as I’ve been in the office more that I began to lose what I
call my field eyes or my field perspective whereas used to be I could go out and look at
some little mine or something and go put some rock on that before I leave because its
starting to wash here or look at potential problems hey, six months down the road this is
going to be a problem you’re going to lose this over here into the creek and you need to
do something about it now. You lose some of that perspective when you sit in the office
because now I find myself, and realizing it is half the battle I guess, but I find myself
going more to well what does it say in the law well ok that’s black and white yeah do this
well, that’s sometimes not practical in the field so it, you and I’ve seen it happen with
bosses as you advance and you do get into the office more and more you lose the field
perspective and its takes both perspectives though you know you can also get in trouble
in the field horse trading as it were. Well, its ok if you do this if you do this over here
because this is a bigger problem. It takes both but I think its important particularly for
upper level managers to get out in the field a little more they ought to once a week spend
half a day somewhere just kind of tromping though the mud (Interview 6).
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There is a lot of skill in being able to do the job the regulators do as quickly and efficiently as
possible. It requires specific knowledge of the area, environmental conditions, and social or
political tact. However, the increasing trend towards standardization takes away the space for
these regulators to use those skills, that BPJ as they refer to it.
Inadequate resources, increasing paperwork, bureaucratic responsibilities, conflicting
goals and expectations within the agency and from the public, and bureaucratic policy constraints
are all issues that came up repeatedly in the interviews as frustrating limitations on the regulators
ability to do their job well.
Coping with Constraints
The third theme that emerged in the interviews was regulators’ collective development of
methods to cope with the contradictions and constraints. Regulators articulated their shared
coping methods in two motifs: defending their work and forming negative conceptualizations of
clients.

Defending Their Work
The individuals I interviewed shared similar sentiments about the regulatory work they
do, often defending and rationalizing their activities. I found many of the regulators shared an
acceptance of the limits of their work, while defending it and arguing that at least it was better
than no regulation at all. When I asked whether their work was compatible with their personal
beliefs about environmental protection one regulator argued that her work may not do enough,
but at least it did something,
By and large its compatible, it may not go far enough but it at least helps further the
cause or causes (Interview 13).
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This shared conceptualization allows these workers to reconcile the limits of their efficiency and
capacity to really protect streams and water bodies in the area.
Similarly, another regulator expressed the same sentiment in a different way,
The problem is that you know, even though you get – it would be a lot worse if they
weren’t there (Interview 2)

He had already identified some of the problems with water protection in Tennessee, but then
followed that critique up with the defense that at least it was better than nothing. This “better
than nothing” belief about their work was also expressed in the shared sentiment among the
regulators that although water quality is not perfect now, it is better than it was before regulation,
Certainly things are vastly better than they were, than 40 years ago when our laws
passed (Interview 13).

Again, this is a defense of the failures of their work. In another interview, a regulator expressed
frustration over continual critiques from the public about their work,
I also saw the world before it was regulated and you didn’t. Believe me it’s a lot cleaner
now than it was (Interview 7).

His response to this critique was to emphasize how far regulation and water protection has come
since the creation of environmental regulation.
Nowadays though, the permits are pretty effective at keeping them better and all the
streams in the coal country have been steadily improving for the last thirty years, ever
since the advent of these rules and regulations (interview 7).

As illustrated in these examples, the regulators I interviewed shared the conceptualization that
although the rules and regulations they enforced may not be perfect, they are better than nothing.
This defense is bolstered by a shared belief in the importance of following those rules and
regulations.
Although they know the bureaucratic processes and rules are not perfect, nearly all of the
regulators defended the rules they followed claiming they were fair, just, and legitimate. This
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theme demonstrates an important shared belief among these regulators, that their work and their
decisions are guided by laws. This belief is contradictory to the sentiment I presented earlier, in
which most of the regulators argued that the laws are constraining and often prevent them from
doing their job well. While they resent these constraints, they also emphasize and celebrate the
value of these rules and their work,
I believe that the government has to provide that um, regulatory um, um, non biased,
where I don’t care who you are you’re going to have to abide by these rules you’re not
paying me anything I’m here and just you know it doesn’t matter who anybody is if
anybody has more money or more power or whatever, you need somebody in there to
control and regulate that has no special interest (Interview 8).

This belief is logical in the experience of these regulators. They are often accused of favoring
one side over the other, and the bureaucratic system and social world they work in often does
favor business interests, so they use the rules to defend their position.
Among the regulators in the Knoxville Field Office there was a sense of pride in
following these rules because they were believed to be fair and just. There was one line in
particular that came up repeatedly,
There is a saying that floats around here, if both sides are mad at you you’re probably
doing something right (laughs) (Interview 2).

This expression, that both sides should be mad at you if you are doing your job well, was
expressed by many of the regulators,
Neither side thinks that we’re doing the job right and as long as neither side thinks we’re
doing it right we’re probably close to doing it (Interview 6).

This belief that their decisions are fair and by the book seemed to be central to how the
regulators conceptualized their job. It also allows them to cope better with the stresses of their
work and the criticisms they often face, especially from citizens.
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As I presented earlier, citizen-clients have expectations of the regulators that is often not
consistent with their responsibility and capacity. This defense of laws and regulations as fair,
just, and better than nothing allows them to better deal with the frustrations and critiques of the
public. As one regulator put it,
Just because you don’t want it here is not a valid reason not to put it here, just as we
have an obligation to listen and address the concerns of citizens and other folks we also
have an obligation to an operator who comes in and dots all the I’s and crosses all the
T’s and presents a perfectly good plan that is implemented minimizes or has no
environmental impact, we’re just as obligated to issues them their permit as we are to
listen to your concerns (Interview 6)

His statement was similar to those made by others, they must be fair in their enforcement and
they cannot always help the citizens that complain, even if it is legitimate.
As the public face of governmental services, like water protection, these regulators have
to bear the brunt of public criticism. Stressing the fairness of laws and their constraints over
enforcement activities allows them to cope with that criticism. For example,
I mean everything we do, on the regulatory side of the house is, basically applying,
following regulations and enforcing regulations you know so we don’t have arbitrary
ability to say “oh well you don’t want that there ok well we’re not gonna let them put it
there” you know we cant (Interview 1).

This sentiment came up repeatedly in the interviews: the argument that their enforcement
decisions are not arbitrary. This conceptualization of their work minimizes any guilt they might
feel for not being able to adequately protect water quality or the interests of the local community.
In a discussion about the critiques they face from the public one regulator explained to
me that they have no capacity to fix or change laws that might not be effective,
We can only go by what’s written and you talk to your state legislator if you want
anything changed or, we have rules that we go by and that’s what we do (interview 8).

Similarly, another regulator thought if the public understood these constraints they would be
more understanding,
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If you look at the laws and the regulations that we have there’s a lot of things we can and
can’t do and I think if people understood what we are limited to by the law or our
regulations I think they would be understanding and you know, this, we can’t, here at this
office, we can’t change those these that’s, you know, you’re going to have to go to the
legislator (Interview 11).

Although it is not a formal part of their job, dealing with the public is a large part of the work
these regulators do. As a result, there were several themes that emerged relating to shared
perceptions of citizen-clients especially.

Conceptualizations of Clients
Citizen-clients are often frustrated with what they see as ineffective environmental
protection. Whether or not the regulators agree with the citizens, there is often little they can do
within the bureaucratic framework of the TDEC. This can be hard to deal with and creates a
tenuous relationship,
To the public we’re not doing a thing, we don’t do near enough we don’t care, they’re
just little poor people out there, we’re in the pocket of the industry, and on the industry
side it’s oh you’re just picking on us (Interview 6).

In a discussion about why the Field Office did not always work with environmental groups, one
employee explained to me the frustration they felt,
I don’t think it is all the department not reaching, I mean there is some human nature
involved in when you are attacked and attacked and called a villain you know (interview
1).

In response to this kind of experience, the regulators find ways to cope with the pressure and
criticism they feel from the public. In my interviews it was especially apparent that there were
shared beliefs amongst the regulators about the clients they interact with.
There was a sense that the public was largely ignorant of how environmental regulation
worked. While this may be because of structural problems with how bureaucracies and public
agencies work, the regulators often expressed that this was a problem with the public in general,
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I think a lot of the public doesn’t have any idea what we do. I think they’re too busy
(Interview 7)

Similarly, there was a shared critique of environmental groups as not really knowing the
processes and creating problems for the regulators,
After so many years of working with regulators, I would define an environmentalist as
one the folks who shows up at the public hearings and sometimes has convoluted ideas
about what the purpose of the public hearing is all about. You know (Interview 4).

There is an insinuation that environmental groups, citizens, and outsiders are not informed well
on the processes or particulars of what is happening in the cases they are opposing.
In many of the interviews there was also a shared conceptualization of citizens and
environmentalists as not being knowledgeable about the processes or issues at hand, and only
being interested in issues that directly affect them.
I think that, um, you know like I said it’s a big department and most people’s dealings
with the department are because they have a concern about a specific issue and how
successful they feel the department is will generally be based on whether the outcome of
that issue was what they wanted or not (Interview 1).

The regulators’ conceptualization of the public’s interests as narrow allowed them to critique
their environmentalism as narrow and less important than the agenda of TDEC which is
supposed to have a wider frame.
It was clear from my interviews that were was a definite tension between the regulators
and the public,
And you can have people who are quote environmentalists that are wasting resources
because what they are doing they are making, they are not stopping anything, they are
prolonging it. And its making someone spend more money, for nothing basically
(laughs) ok, so lets move on (laughs) (Interview 3).

Similar sentiments were echoed by others, this critical conceptualization of the public,
environmentalists, and their framed them as “unworthy” clients. These shared beliefs eased the
reality of the work done by the regulators. They are not able to fully protect the interests of their
citizen-clients, conceptualizing them as “unworthy” rationalizes this inability.
	
  

66	
  

While citizens are framed as “unworthy,” in many of my interviews the regulated-clients
that the regulators worked with were conceptualized as more “worthy.” While citizens and
environmental groups are critiqued for being ignorant of how processes work, the regulators
often praised facilities for knowing the processes and following the rules,
Um, the ones that have been regulated longest begin to view it as normal cost of doing
business no different than playing for electricity to run their machinery. Its been there
since 1972 and its part of what they do they understand when, they cease to think about
it in terms of is this good or bad or fair (Interview 7).

Their knowledge of the processes, and the emphasis on negotiation in environmental regulation,
creates a different type of relationship between the regulators and their regulated-clients,
The big companies are often the easiest to work with because they do have somebody in
house so I deal with the same person every time. Um, they’ve been around they have
fifteen permits they know what the rules are, they call us ahead of time and say hey, I’m
thinking of doing this, so its easier for everybody in the long run (Interview 9).

The working relationship between regulated-clients and the regulators was framed in a far better
light than that with the citizen-clients. In this way the regulated-clients were conceptualized as
“worthy,” which has implications for how they are treated by the regulators. This is especially
important in terms of how they negotiate with them in the permitting process and the decisions
they make when prioritizing cases.

Conclusion
This analysis tells a story about the experiences of local environmental regulators. It
shows they have a desire to do their job well, they care about the environment and value their
job. However, they face constraints that limit their capacity to do so. They also experience
conflicting expectations about their superiors, from the public, and from the regulated
community. In order to cope with these constraints and conflicts, the regulators create techniques
to do their job as best they can. Additionally, they conceptualize their work and their clients in
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particular ways that allow them to rationalize the inconsistencies in their work. This occupational
culture, the shared meanings, knowledge, and coping techniques that these individuals exhibit,
has direct implications for the decisions they make and as Lipsky (2010) argues, the policies they
carry out.
Following Lipsky’s (2010) arguments, I posit that the techniques and conceptualizations
the regulators develop influence how they enforce the water quality laws they are charged with.
This is especially evident in the ways they conceptualize and interact with citizen-clients and
regulated-clients. Furthermore, the prioritizing and negotiating techniques they use to make the
most of their resources and maintain control in their workspace are often informed by how they
conceptualize their clients, favoring the interests of the regulated-clients. In addition to the larger
power structures or individual inclinations that favor business interests, I argue that the
bureaucratic framework of TDEC, and other public agencies, foster inequities of policy
enforcement. The next and final chapter will summarize my findings and propose directions for
future research.
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Chapter Six
Conclusions
The outcome of environmental policy like the CWA often does not reflect their initial
goals and purposes. The ongoing environmental injustices and ecological problems that exist in
the United States are, in many ways, a result of political interference and organizational
problems in the policy process. Political and economic interests are able to interfere at every
stage in the environmental policy process. Consequently, the outcomes typically favor the shortterm economic interests of corporations, rather than protecting the natural resources and interests
of the people.
Substantial research demonstrates how this occurs on a national level in the early stages
of the policy process. Even before a policy is created powerful stakeholders are able to shape the
construction of environmental problems through discourse and framing, in order to minimize or
maximize public support for their agendas (Krogman 1996). In the agenda setting step they are
able to lobby legislators and politicians to influence which environmental problems will be
addressed through executive and legislative action (Kraft 2004). When environmental policies
are formulated and implemented, powerful actors influence the stringency of policy again
through lobbying and also through funding biased scientific research (Bonds 2010). There is
however, less research that examines how this influence continues into the enforcement stage.
The influence of political and economic interests during enforcement occurs largely as a
result of organizational and bureaucratic structures. Not only is environmental policy constructed
in a way that favors business interests, but the mechanisms through which it is enforced further
promotes those interests. The federalist model, for example, creates disorganization and
inefficiency in enforcement (Lieber and Rosinoff 1975). The uniform application of broad-brush
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national policies in socially and ecologically diverse regions is illogical. The haphazard
construction of environmental policy and the agencies that enforce it has led to significant
disorganization: gaps and overlaps in enforcement duties and jurisdictions (Crane 1994, Adler
2010). Also, the very nature of bureaucratic organizations creates particular cultures and political
conflicts internally and externally that hinder their overall success (Merton 1940, Brown 1998,
Heffron 1989). These organizational problems create loopholes and spaces for the interests of
businesses to act in ways that promote their interests.
The existing environmental policy literature provides a compelling macro-level analysis
of problems with enforcement. The inefficient and unjust enforcement of environmental policies,
like the CWA, is clearly related to the political and organizational structure of the environmental
policy process. It is, however, unclear from the literature how exactly this happens.
In order to explore how the mismatch between the goals and outcomes of policy happen
on a local level during the enforcement stage, I used an ethnographic case study of local, streetlevel bureaucrats who perform enforcement duties under the CWA in Tennessee. I examined
how political interference and the bureaucratic structures of the policy process affect their
experiences and their work.
The structure of enforcement allows for a trickle-down of political interference through a
systematic lack of resources, the mandated use of broad-brush policies, and a lack of space for
local flexibility. All of the regulators I interviewed expressed the sentiment that they wished they
could do their job more effectively but they did not have the time or resources to do so. The lack
of resources available to these regulators stems directly from federal and state pressure to
decrease funding for environmental protection, as it threatens economic interests. As a result the
time of local regulators is stretched thin and they are not able to spend as much time in the field,
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where they all argued they needed to be in order to effectively enforce compliance with policy
mandates. Along with the lack of resources, personnel, and time within a bureaucracy like TDEC
comes the agency’s pressure for increased standardization in an effort to be more efficient.
The increasing pressure for standardization and efficiency experienced by the regulators
limits their capacity to use their own localized expertise when making decisions regarding
enforcement. Each case they encounter not only has unique social characteristics, but also unique
ecological and hydrologic considerations as well. The processes they follow often do not allow
for such discretion, leading to enforcement decisions that may not be the most effective or fair
for particular cases. The bureaucratic goal of ensuring fairness in policy enforcement demands
that all cases be treated the same, but all cases are not the same.
Another outcome of these bureaucratic and political constraints is friction between
regulators and the citizens and environmental groups in the local communities where
enforcement occurs. Enforcing policies like the CWA, which is written to be business-friendly,
often leads them to following processes that favor economic interests. They are expected to make
decisions that simultaneously protect the environment for their citizen-clients but also do not
hinder economic progress for their regulated-clients. Hence the shared sentiment that they are not
doing there job properly unless everyone is upset with them. Although they generalized this
sentiment, the regulators most often talked about environmental groups and local citizens being
upset with them.
There was a marked difference in the way the regulators talked about and perceived
citizen-clients and regulated-clients. The regulated community is directly involved in regulatory
processes and must know the rules and regulations. Many of the entities the TDEC employees
interact with have been working with them for a long time and have built up partnerships. They
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were talked about in a way that highlighted the improvement in their environmental measures,
the initiatives they were taking on their own, and their overall compliance.
On the other hand, citizen-clients and environmental groups are not directly involved in
the enforcement process, despite being very affected by the outcomes. Consequently, they did
not have as thorough an understanding of the rules and processes. The regulators often talked
about them in negative ways, being uninformed or irrational. In this way, an insider/outsider
dichotomy was created based on knowledge of rules and processes. This dichotomy clearly
influenced the way the regulators perceived the clients they are supposed to be working for, and,
inevitably, how they treat them.
Many of the individuals I spent time with expressed a desire to work more with the
community, but also a frustration with community members. They described to me how citizens
become upset with the regulators because their work does not protect the citizen’s particular
interests, but often they are not able to under the policy they enforce. Few citizens have a
nuanced knowledge of the complex network of policy and programs that TDEC enforces. The
regulators, who are the face of policies on a local level, expressed that they often feel attacked
for not dealing with problems that are beyond their control. Consequently a negative tension
arises between the regulators and the community they serve.
In sum, I found that although the local regulators I interviewed desire to do their job well,
they are prevented from doing so by bureaucratic, economic, and political constraints. As a
result, they conceptualize their work and their clients in particular ways to ameliorate the strain
they experience. However, these conceptualizations affect their perceptions and actions, creating
negative tensions between regulators and communities and reinforcing the ideology of the
bureaucracy and the primacy of economic business interests.
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Previous environmental policy analyses have not systematically explored the ways in
which the politics and organizational features of the U.S. policy framework affects social
relations on the local level My research indicates that the bureaucratic structure of policy
enforcement strengthens the influence of powerful economic interests in the policy process by
preventing the building of relationships among local level environmental regulators and the
community they work in. It creates insider and outsider groups based on knowledge of regulation
rules and programs, which alienates those not directly involved in the processes: the citizenclients and environmental community.
This is problematic for the protection of natural resources, which should be the ultimate
goal of an environmental policy, in a local area when the entities within that community who are
interested in environmental issues are unable to work together. The negative relationship also
leads many of the regulators to reinforce the problematic bureaucratic standards that limit their
capacity to protect the environment as more legitimate and necessary. In defending their work,
they strengthen the boundaries constructed between themselves and the community they serve.
This type of work is an important direction for research in environmental policy,
environmental sociology, and natural resource management. Although national guidelines for
water quality standards are necessary to maintain equality, my research indicates that a less
standardized, decentralized protection effort, informed more by the experiences of those who do
localized enforcement might be more efficient. The unique ecological factors of the various
regions in the United States, along with the historical, social, political and economic
considerations that also play a role in enforcement decisions, demand a more specialized
approach to regulation. It also could be better for building bridges, generating new ideas, and
sharing knowledge within communities if policy and program creation occurred on a local level
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with room for citizen involvement in the process. This would eliminate the problematic
insider/outsider tensions that arise within the current system. It seems that a less bureaucratic
model for enforcement would lead to healthier communities: socially, politically, and
environmentally.
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TDEC Interview Questions
Tell me about yourself. Where are you from? How did you get to be working here?
Family?
Education?
Why did you choose this career?
Have there been any particular experiences that inspired you?
How long? Have you done other work?
Do you consider yourself an environmentalist?
How do you define an environmentalist?
If you do, how do you order your priorities?
As a government employee first, an environmentalist first, or another way?
Tell me about your job, what do you do?
What are your daily activities?
Why is this job important?
Do you enjoy what you do?
What is the best part of your job?
What is the worst part of your job?
How do you think the public views the work you do?
Do you often work with members of the community or community organizations?
Is it/would it be valuable to work with community organization? Why?
How do you think the industries or companies that you regulate view the work that you do?
Are most cooperative?
How does your department interact with the EPA?
How do you interact with the environmental departments of other states?
Is there cooperation between state departments?
Are your programs successful?
How do you measure the success of your programs?
How does the community measure success?
How do the EPA and the Federal Government measure success?
Do you think the system is effective?
Are there any aspects of your work you’d like to talk about further?
Anything else I should know about?
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